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1Section 1
Introduction and background
About this manual
This manual presents the findings from Project R6264 The Procurement of
Infrastructure for Urban Low Income Communities carried out by the
Authors as part of the Technology, Development and Research Programme,
Engineering Division, Department For International Development of the
British Government. The purpose of the project is to investigate the extent
and nature of the involvement of low income urban communities in the
provision of their local infrastructure.
The purpose of this manual is to provide guidance for promoting increased
involvement of low income urban communities in the procurement of
neighbourhood (tertiary level) infrastructure. The contexts are several and
varied including:
• upgrading works carried out by urban government;
• donor funded urban development programmes;
• programmes initiated by non government organisations (NGOs).
The manual aims to demonstrate the potential benefits to be gained from
community partnered procurement. The readership for the manual are policy
makers and professional staff of urban government, development agencies,
non-government organisations, and small to medium enterprises involved
with infrastructure procurement for low income urban communities. The
content of the manual applies to those frequently occurring, low risk, routine
small infrastructure works which characterise neighbourhood urban upgrad-
ing programmes and projects. We investigate cases relating to water supply,
sanitation, drainage, access, paving, street and security lighting, solid waste
removal, and community buildings. It is not applicable to complex, large,
high risk and high hazard infrastructure projects.
The findings are based on the results of interviews and a review of
literature, documents and project files on urban upgrading projects in
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2Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka. We are particularly grateful to the many
government officials who so generously gave their time to us, and provided
access to very detailed information on a wide range of both community-based
infrastructure works and conventional procurement contracts.
The manual further develops the material contained in the earlier interim
findings booklet, which was distributed informally in 1996. Its subject matter
is timely in that the findings support the underlying themes of partnership
implicit in the Habitat II city summit held in Istanbul in 1996.
Section 1 is about the manual itself, the background and scope of work;
Section 2 outlines the process of infrastructure procurement; Section 3
briefly describes the cases which have been analysed, and refers to Annex 1
in which a detailed narrative and commentary are provided for each case.
Section 4 discusses the main themes which emerge from the cases, and
Section 5 offers guidance to actual and potential practitioners of community
partnered procurement of neighbourhood infrastructure. This is the key
section of the manual, and is identified by tinted pages. A literature review
and listing of data sources will be available separately.
Background and scope of work
The urban population in most developing countries is increasing extremely
rapidly. Conventional approaches have proved inadequate to meet the
demand for shelter and services created by this rapid urban growth and this
has led to a proliferation of informal, unimproved slum and squatter settle-
ments where the inhabitants generally experience high levels of unemploy-
ment and underemployment. The United Nations Centre for Human Settle-
ments suggests that between 40 per cent and 50 per cent of the population in
many cities live in such settlements; according to present trends, this is likely
to increase. The ability of government to provide infrastructure is already far
outstripped by the inexorable increase in demand, so that the poorest and
most vulnerable will continue to suffer from the lack of services and work
opportunities.
This manual is about the procurement of infrastructure; that is, what
mechanisms, both conventional and unconventional, government and non-
government, have been adopted in efforts to deliver improved services.
There is a noticeable lack of published material and guidance on the many
different approaches which have been adopted in infrastructure procure-
ment. We explore the mechanisms and processes of agreements, procedures
and contracts that are the basis for implementation of infrastructure improve-
ments for urban low income communities. The specific focus is on situations
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3where communities have taken a part in the planning and implementation of
their neighbourhood infrastructure; this we term community partnered
procurement.
This is one of the first investigations to look in detail at such community
initiatives in the context of low income urban settlements and as such we have
been primarily attempting to draw out a number of key themes and issues.
Having established these key themes, it becomes apparent that in themselves
they merit detailed investigation. A good example is the importance of the
wider social and economic impacts of infrastructure; our work has shown this
to be a key issue. However, detailed evaluation of these social and economic
impacts has been outside the scope of this work, although we do indicate
situations where we believe significant impacts have been achieved. This
(and there are others) clearly requires separate further investigation.
The stimulation for this work has been the increasing international interest
in promoting the participation of community groups in improving access to
basic services at the household and neighbourhood levels. There is a
substantial body of work addressing the issues of community participation
and empowerment, which identifies barriers to increased community partici-
pation and suggests ideas and techniques for tackling the problems. These
include the many currently popular tools related to participatory appraisal.
Broadly speaking, this approaches matters internally, that is, the focus is on
the cowmmunity, although appropriate institutional responses to increase the
levels of participation are also considered.
However, with regard to community partnered procurement an additional
set of barriers exist, namely the rules and procedures which urban govern-
ment adopts in relation to procurement. These provide the framework within
which urban government operates and the key question is whether existing
rules and procedures offer any scope for the increased community participa-
tion which is being advocated. We therefore look in detail at why these
procedures are used and how they work; we believe that understanding these
processes is central to increasing the access of community groups to the funds
and other resources of urban government.
There are cases where community partnered procurement operates outside
the purview of urban government and we have included some examples .
However, our main objective in writing this manual is to offer guidance as to
how such local initiatives can be successfully integrated with urban govern-
ment, as we believe that in this way it may be possible to see more responsive
urban government and to increase the access which the urban poor have to
resources for improved services.
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4Photograph 1:
Septic tank construction by community contractor in Colombo, Sri Lanka
Insides - main text home 1.pmd 31/01/2003, 09:414
5Section 2
Infrastructure procurement
Procurement is the process of buying the goods, works or services, which in
our case comprise the infrastructure and services described previously. In
engineering terms, the works themselves are minor and usually of low cost,
but are nevertheless complex to implement given the physical and social
fabric of low income urban areas. We adopt the term micro-contract to refer
to the countless number of small contracts for works which are the mainstay
of urban improvement in South Asia. The contract value is typically less than
£10 000, and the duration less than one year.
This project is based on work carried out in India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka
where the legal framework was developed during the colonial period and is
based on English law. During this time, the Public Works Department was
responsible for implementation of building, public health, irrigation and
general civil works. Detailed procedures were made to handle contemporary
problems in the procurement of infrastructure; it is interesting to review their
development, and to note that they were frequently amended in response to
new situations. It was the then Superintending Engineers responsible for the
works who suggested changes as and when they felt it necessary.
This contrasts sharply with the present day; in the post colonial period in
Pakistan, for example, there have been few changes in almost fifty years. The
situation has changed and continues to change, yet there is a lack of
responsiveness to reflect this in the procurement procedures. This has led to
an increasing gap between what is theoretically meant to happen and what
actually happens on the ground, which leads in turn to inflexibility and lack
of transparency.
At this stage, it is useful to consider briefly some of the basic concepts which
will be central to the analysis of our findings. The procedures refer to the
organized system within which projects are conceived, planned, and brought
into being by urban government. The contract is a legally binding agreement
between parties based on an offer by one party to do something (in our case to
construct the infrastructure) in return for a consideration (that is, payment).
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6In urban government in South Asia, the most commonly used procedures
for the procurement of infrastructure are those which lead to the award of
contracts through competitive tender (Boxes 1, 2, 3). Their underlying
objectives are concerned with ensuring competition which is viewed as a key
factor in achieving the twin objectives of:
• Accountability in the spending of public money.
• Transparency in the steps of the decision-making processes.
In relation to the actual contracts, we need to focus on who is involved in
a contract and what their various obligations are. The most commonly used
engineering contracts recognize a ‘triangle of actors’: Promoter; Engineer;
and Contractor.
A typical case in South Asia (and elsewhere) involves urban government
letting a contract to a private sector contractor for the construction of
infrastructure improvements. Urban government is the promoter; they have
planned and designed the work, and are paying for it to be implemented.
Urban government appoints an Engineer, who is usually in the full time
employment of the relevant government department. It is rare for private
sector consultants to fulfil this role for minor engineering works in South
Asia. In accordance with the procedures laid down (see Box 4), a contractor
is appointed to do the actual construction work.
The Engineer has the important role of ensuring that the interests of the
promoter are met, and that the contractor is duly paid for his efforts. The
promoter wants the best value for money and the contractor wants a good
profit; whilst this can involve an enormous range of complex and contentious
issues, satisfying the various interests often comes down to ensuring that a
‘triangle of objectives’ are met:
• Cost: has the work been completed within the costs agreed in the contract?
• Quality: has the work been done in accordance with what was specified?
• Time: has the work been satisfactorily completed within the time specified?
Engineer
Promotor
Contractor
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7The traditionally accepted objectives of procurement procedures and
contract documents are to ensure that works are executed at the minimum
cost that is consistent with the need to achieve a product of acceptable quality
within an acceptable timeframe. They do this by reducing uncertainty, which
in turn is done by:
• clearly defining who is liable to take any risk that cannot be eliminated
from the project;
• providing information on the work to be carried out so that all concerned
are clear about what has to be done and what their role is in doing it.
Why community partnering?
Community groups and individual householders do not figure anywhere in
the procedures, contracts and documentation used in these circumstances. It
is assumed that they are passive consumers who are deemed to be satisfied
if works are undertaken to the satisfaction of the promoter i.e. the concerned
agency of urban government. Is this assumption justified, and if not what are
the implications?
Normal government practice is based on the twin assumptions that a
competitive market for infrastructure provision exists and that the best way
to operate in this market is through competitive tendering procedures. The
competitive market only works in practice if contractors act independently;
this does not always happen in practice. Certain situations exist where
contractors are concerned with stability rather than expanding their market
share and maximising their profitability; the outcome is that they share out
the available work between them. One consequence of this ‘pooling’ of work
is that the assumption that conventional tendering procedures will produce
the lowest cost work is not justified in practice.
The role of the Engineers in urban government is to ensure that objectives
relating to cost, quality and time are achieved. As we report in Section 4 the
objective which is most difficult to assess, and causes most concern, is the
quality of the finished work. The fact is that neither they as supervisors nor
the government as promoters are primary stakeholders with a strong motiva-
tion for ensuring that adequate work practices and standards are maintained.
It is questionable whether value for money is achieved; thus several reasons
for promoting community partnering arise:
• Community members are directly affected by the way in which work is
carried out and have a strong incentive to see that it is carried out properly.
• Resources can be channelled into the community rather than being
siphoned off by outside contractors. Whereas conventional procurement
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8of infrastructure has a single benefit, the provision of the infrastructure
itself, community partnering can double the benefits obtained from
investment. Infrastructure is provided and employment opportunities
and enterprises are created in the community.
• People are empowered to take more control of their own lives.
• Increased access to local knowledge is gained on such issues as the
location of existing services and a reduction in the potential for disputes
with community members in the course of work on site.
These arguments can be opposed on a number of grounds. Many govern-
ment engineers are sceptical about the ability of community partnering to
provide services to the required standard. Others fear that community
partnering is likely to prove too complex to be much use in practice.
Nevertheless, we have found that the involvement of community members
and groups in the procurement of their local infrastructure is quite wide-
spread but not, at present, great in scale. Consequently there are a number
of questions to be addressed:
• If the procedures, contracts and documentation do not foresee a role for
community members and groups, then how have existing community-
based initiatives worked?
• To what extent do existing procedures create barriers to greater involve-
ment of community groups as primary stakeholders ?
• How can these barriers be overcome in a way which is acceptable to
urban government?
• Is there potential for increasing the scale of community partnering to a
level at which it impacts on conditions in low income informal areas at
a national scale?
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9Section 3
The cases
The case study material is presented as a series of boxes comprising a
narrative which describes the pertinent facts of the situation, and a corre-
sponding commentary which draws out significant points to be used as the
basis for the discussion and guidelines. The narrative information is pre-
sented in considerable detail, as a cornerstone of this work is to understand
the practical detail of how community partnered procurement has operated.
As this requires considerable space, the boxes are located in Annex 1.
The following can be found in Annex 1:
• Boxes 1 to 6 give the background to government procedures for the
procurement of infrastructure, which are in general terms common to the
three study countries.
• Boxes 7 to 18 concern the different roles and responsibilities assumed by
the various partners.
• Boxes 19 to 25 focus on issues related to processes and contracting which
involve communities.
• Boxes 26 to 30 look at different forms of agreement and contract which
have been used.
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Photograph 3:
Community management of neighbourhood drain construction in Colombo, Sri Lanka
Photograph 2:
Micro contractors improving secondary drainage, Cuttack, India
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Section 4
Lessons from the cases
Roles and responsibilities
One of the most interesting findings is the wide variety of ways in which
community groups become involved in the development of local infrastruc-
ture and service provision. They take on and adapt to many differing roles,
ranging from informal advisers, through to formally appointed micro-
contractors with legally binding contracts to construct the works, for which
they receive cash payment. We have found examples of community groups
participating in all of the roles within the contractual triangle described in
Section 1. For example:
• Community as promoter (Boxes 7 to 9).
• Community as engineer (Boxes 10 to 13).
• Community as contractor (Boxes 14 to 18).
These are reflected by the following examples of detailed activities:
• Participation in the identification, planning and design of improvements
(Boxes 7, 8, 9).
• Involvement in the supervision and quality control of works undertaken
by a government contractor appointed through the standard tendering
procedures (Box 10).
• Use of waged local labour in Departmental Works; materials are procured
either by the community or by the government department (Box 13).
• Use of community labour engaged and paid through labour-only con-
tracts (Box 15).
• Community-based labour employed by a private sector contractor ap-
pointed under the tender-contract system (Box 14).
• Entrustment of works by negotiation, where the community group has
management control of the construction and chooses whether it uses local
labour or hires in labour from outside (Box 16).
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• Formation of local societies with the view to undertaking work in a
number of slum communities (Box 18).
• Capacity building and skills upgrading of micro-contractors and commu-
nity groups with the assistance of NGOs (Boxes 7, 8).
• Improvements financed partly by the community and partly by govern-
ment (Box 9).
• Improvements which are fully financed internally by the community who
develop procedures specific to their needs without any government
involvement but with NGO support (Boxes 7, 8).
It is therefore particularly important not to typecast peoples’ involvement
in terms of the traditional ‘community-labour’ approach. In fact it cannot be
assumed that urban low income communities will do the construction
labouring work themselves. We have found evidence of community groups
engaging in sophisticated sub contracting and management (Boxes 7, 18 and
19). It can be more complex if the community becomes both Promoter and
Contractor (Box 7). On the other hand, some communities are mainly
interested in the opportunities for waged employment as a means of boosting
their very low incomes.
Operation and maintenance of urban infrastructure has traditionally been
an area of serious neglect. Recognising community groups as primary
stakeholders can introduce additional complications, which may partly be
reflected by confusion over ownership:
• as a developmental concept relating to processes which involve commu-
nity groups as primary stakeholders;
• as a legal concept in relation to the assets created.
Disputes over responsibility arose when the departmental works proce-
dure was used in collaboration with a NGO and community groups in
Karachi (Box 13), despite the fact that the implementation of the works was
successful. The importance of clarity during negotiations is brought out by
the rather complex situation in a CSPU contract in Sri Lanka (Box 23). The
CSPU is a project unit within a government department, and is the partial (80
per cent) promoter; it argues that it cannot enter into maintenance contracts
‘because of the temporary nature (of the CSPU)’. No arrangements with
other agencies are in place, and it is tacitly assumed that the community
based organisation (CBO) is responsible for maintenance.
This contrasts with the approach in Calcutta (Box 10); although the
community only has a role as informal advisers, the promoter (the Urban
Development Authority) ensures as part of the negotiations that arrange-
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ments are in place for handover to the maintaining authority (the Municipal
Corporation).
All the indications are that, contrary to the views of a number of profession-
als, urban infrastructure at the local (tertiary) level is not ‘too complicated’
for ordinary people to get to grips with. Urban infrastructure is complex, but
nevertheless community groups in different situations demonstrate their
ability to play a positive role. The key point to emerge is that there is no single
identifiable role model for Community Partnered Procurement.
Government procedures: a surprising amount of scope
Given the complexity of roles and responsibilities which we have found to
exist in community partnered procurement, it is necessary to explore in detail
how these initiatives can link into urban government through the confines of
their procedures. Local government procurement procedures are described
in Boxes 1 and 2. The most significant finding (Box 2) is that some of these
procedures allow a surprising degree of flexibility. Negotiation is acceptable,
and it is even possible to offer works at a discount to certain registered
societies and cooperatives.
In Pakistan (Boxes 13 and 25) we have a case where Departmental Works
Procedure (Box 2) has been adopted on a large scale with the involvement of
a NGO. External works have been procured in this way, with the subsequent
result that community groups financed and installed internal lane-level
works. The motivation and backing for this approach comes from the top
official in the organisation in response to problems with poor quality, cost
overruns and time overruns which plagued work carried out under the routine
tender contract system. This is one of many indications of an inherent danger
in the way the tender-contract system is used, whereby it offers cheapness as
opposed to value for money.
However, it is clear that a distinction needs to be drawn between what is
done as a matter of routine and what could be done within existing
procedures. The routine is to use competitive tender to award the contract to
the lowest bidder because this is believed to ensure de facto the objective of
value for money. Adopting other procedures, which are by definition non-
routine, is theoretically acceptable, but few engineers are willing to subject
themselves to the consequent need for justifying such a decision.
It is usual that only enlisted contractors are permitted to tender for work
with urban government (Box 4). This preliminary screening process is
designed to weed out unsuitable candidates. However, the problem is that the
material and financial constraints which enlistment imposes means that
community groups are excluded from the most common routine procurement
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mechanism. Therefore we need to look for alternatives in the early stages of
the community groups acting as contractors.
We also observe the officials of urban government negotiating satisfactory
arrangements with the community along the lines of the systems (which do
not involve government) operating in Orangi (Box 7). The outcome is of
mutual benefit firstly to the community through empowerment and income
generation and secondly to urban government who get better value for money
and better quality work (Box 18). Yet these officials are struggling to provide
file notes and documentary support which mirror the formally sanctioned
procedures, but which in themselves are of little significance to the success
of the partnership with the community (Boxes 16 and 17). An important issue
for these officials is not the cost or the quality per se, but an ability to prove
in accordance with procedure that the cost was advantageous to government;
this is essential to protect themselves from the unwelcome attention of the
Central Audit and Account Organisation.
We believe that this reluctance to do anything other than accept the lowest
tender, regardless of the appropriateness or likely outcome, is due in no small
part to the system of financial auditing which has developed. The following
points are central to this vexing problem:
• The money flowing in and out of government departments at all levels is
controlled by the Central Audit and Account Organisation; this is a
powerful organisation in terms of the power and influence it wields.
• It can (and sometimes does) act in a malign way; officials can be called to
account for the minutest deviation from arcane rules. Government Engi-
neers are vested with the authority of sanctioning different stages of the
procurement process. They can subsequently be held personally liable for
overspending, and in extreme cases face the possibility of personal ruin.
• The key concern is to demonstrate value for money and that rules have
been followed to the letter. This does not necessarily equate with probity
and efficiency in the spending of public money.
• Audit requirements, or more accurately fear of the audit on the part of
middle and junior ranking officials, can be taken as a governing factor in
the use of what we describe as ‘non routine’ procedure in the public sector.
In general, they require the written backing of the equivalent of the Chief
Executive before adopting non-routine procedures.
The problem is that procedures designed to try to eliminate malpractice also
stifle genuine innovation. Without the explicit backing of top officials, few
middle ranking engineers are prepared to adopt anything other than the
competitive tender; the risks are simply not worth taking.
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The Engineer is of crucial importance in community partnered procure-
ment because of the delegated authority vested in the position. Any changes
designed to promote community partnering as a means of procurement of
works undertaken with public money must not increase their personal risk.
Accountability and transparency
We have recognised limitations of the tender contract system and tried to
identify some of the practical (as opposed to theoretical) reasons for its
widespread adoption to the exclusion of almost everything else. The procure-
ment of infrastructure is complex and expensive regardless of how or by
whom it is done. It is therefore important to see how other procedures which
offer more scope for community partnered procurement can satisfy the twin
goals of transparency and accountability; the means of achieving this could
hardly be more diverse.
Whose money is it?
We have encountered three different situations regarding sources of finance:
1. Government money is used to finance the works; community groups are
paid for services which they provide. This injects money into the local
economy.
2. Government money is not involved; the finance is raised internally by
community groups and existing money recirculates in the local economy.
3. Split funding with contributions from government and community groups.
The source of finance is the single most important factor in relation to the
procedures and rules which are adopted for infrastructure procurement. If
government finance is involved, whether in full or in part, its rules and
procedures which run into volumes of written words must be adhered to
(Boxes 1 and 2). This includes money from other sources such as bilateral
agencies which is channelled through government. We have seen what a
powerful influence audit and accounting arrangements can have on the
behaviour of Engineers.
Negotiation between urban government and a community group to agree a
price for the work resulted in a lower price than conventional tendering would
have produced, a fact which is very important for the officials of urban
government in justifying the process (Boxes 15 and 16).
If the finance is raised by the community, then they are at liberty to define
and use whatever mechanisms they feel confident with (Box 7). They develop
systems which have minimal written documentation and are enforceable by
social pressure and ‘private ordering’ rather than ‘court ordering’ Relatively
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little reliance is placed on the written word, and trust between the partners is
the key.
In Faisalabad, Pakistan (Box 9) a hybrid situation with joint financing has
arisen. Thus on the same micro contract, the community groups on the one
hand and government agencies on the other require different procedures to
satisfy their own perceptions of transparency and accountability. A lot of
confidence building is necessary if residents are to be encouraged to deposit
money in a joint account with government, as in this case. No formal contracts
are on file for the construction of the lane sewers.
However, the FAUP procurement strategy for lane sewers has been suc-
cessful as measured by cost and quality, which are themselves key objectives
for government procurement. The irony is that if the FAUP system were
subject to scrutiny by the government’s Central Audit and Account Organi-
sation, in all probability questions would be raised about the procedures used
to demonstrate value for money. Here, then, is the archetypal problem
whereby successful community partnering develops on the fringes of urban
government; yet looming on the horizon is the apparent inability of govern-
ment to assimilate these successful processes and procedures.
How are decisions reached?
In the routine tender-contract procedures, the relationships between pro-
moter, engineer and contractor are clearly defined and understood by the
parties involved. Everything is set out in the contract and its accompanying
documentation. When problems arise, formal mechanisms specified in the
contract for dispute resolution are invoked. One of the most striking facts
about the formal contracts which are run by the engineers of urban govern-
ment is the high standard of documentation and record keeping, which in
some cases such as the CMDA in Calcutta is exemplary (Box 10). In these
files are the records which demonstrate that the concerned officials have
followed the rules and procedures (Box 1). Some day, they might have to
answer to procedural queries raised by the Central Audit and Accounts
Department and, by means of these files, will be called to account for their
actions.
This contrasts with many of the cases in which community groups are
involved together with urban government; a continuous process of negotia-
tion and dialogue is more in evidence. In a number of cases this is because the
parties are working in a genuinely experimental situation in which there are
no hard and fast rules. Informal negotiation emerges as a key element in
successful initiatives involving community groups; it provides mechanisms
for agreeing costs and resolving disputes. The real business of dispute
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resolution in Cuttack, India (Box 17) was done by negotiation; some of the
documents and file notes have the appearance of ‘after the event’ formalities.
The FAUP (Box 9) set up its own project approval committee, whose
purpose is to grant sanction to specific project activities. Its membership includes
officials from other urban government agencies. These members (quite appro-
priately) questioned the legitimacy of the actions of the committee.
An interesting contrast is provided by a case in Pakistan (Box 7) where
people get on with things themselves, with the support of a NGO, but without
the involvement of urban government. Agreements between residents and
micro-contractors are negotiated; there is no written contract because it
would serve no useful purpose. The system is well established, and disputes
are resolved through negotiation without recourse to any written agreement.
A cost estimate is prepared on the basis of market rates and in a form which
is useful to the residents in managing the work; this contrasts with standard
government procedure (Box 6) where even for a formal contractor the official
methods of cost estimation are not helpful in managing the work.
This draws attention to the importance of the local micro-contractors who
play a crucial role, but who are rarely the focus of discussion. These masons,
carpenters and plumbers provide the skilled labour input and often manage
the micro-contracts for local improvement works. Their importance has
emerged in Pakistan (Boxes 7 and 13), in Sri Lanka (Box 19) and in India (Box
16). The ability and experience of the micro-contractors provide a crucial link
in the chain leading to a successful outcome. They are key players in any
negotiations about price, and their ability and skills are important determi-
nants of the quality of the work produced.
Performance of community partnered procurement
It is necessary to review how the performance of these relatively limited
experiences compares with the conventional tender contract systems. As a
starting point we attempt some comparisons with the traditional performance
measures of procurement contracts, namely time, cost, and quality of work.
In order to achieve credibility, community partnered procurement needs to
measure up at least as well as the tender contract system on these traditional
performance indicators.
Cost
The use of informal negotiation to agree prices and resolve operational
problems is an important feature of community partnering. However, with
regard to agreeing a price, there needs to be a basis around which the
negotiations can proceed. Cost estimates based on the existing Schedule of
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Rates (Box 6) has been used in Sri Lanka and India; this creates problems
for community groups unless estimations based on market rates are also
made. The market testing approach has also been tried (Box 16).
The specific evidence we have uncovered from a preliminary analysis of
390 micro contracts in India and Pakistan and Sri Lanka indicates that the
final price for community partnered works is lower than for the conventional
tender contract system. The mean cost growth (that is, the ratio of actual
completion cost to the tendered cost) for 239 cases of conventionally
procured works using the tender contract system is 1.0, whereas for 151
community partnered procurement arrangements the mean value is 0.90.
The key point is that this outcome is achieved through negotiating down the
rates for the work. This has been officially recognised in the Treasury
Circulars of the Government of Sri Lanka (Boxes 20 and 21). Whilst these
mean values mask considerable variations, it is interesting to observe the
overall control on costs which is being achieved.
Time
The required completion time is specified in the conventional tender
contract system; penalties such as liquidated damages can be invoked,
although interviews with engineers suggest that in practice this is hardly
ever done on micro contracts. The mean time growth (that is, the ratio of the
actual lapse time of the construction to the duration stated in the contract)
for 239 cases of conventionally procured works using the tender contract
system is 1.5, whereas for 151 community partnered procurement arrange-
ments the mean value is 1.9. It is not clear why this is so large compared with
the cost growth reported above; the implication is that cost growth is a
serious concern to supervising engineers and they control it in order to avoid
getting into personal difficulty. There does not seem to be a similar pressure
to control time overrun. In community partnered works, we have found little
concern with completion time, to the extent that it is often not mentioned at
all in the agreements. In Sri Lanka, the NHDA guidelines for community
based works contain a liquidated damages clause, although officials com-
ment that they would never intend invoking it. The impression is that with
community partnering arrangements there is sufficient incentive available
for the work to be completed without the need for invoking penalties.
The detailed findings of the investigations into time and cost growth in
micro contracts will be published separately.
Quality
It is difficult to measure quality of work in a quantitative way, and to date we
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have only found subjective opinions. However, some of these are quite
telling; for example Box 13 describes how poor quality of work was a key
contributing factor in abandoning the tender contract system in favour of
Departmental Works. Supervision of work by community groups is reported
to be successful (Boxes 8 and 10); this benefited from setting down a clear
structure for their involvement. The Sri Lankan experience reports im-
proved quality. There are no reported cases of the quality of the work being
worse with community partnering. It is nevertheless important to note that
some of the experiences, for example Boxes 7 and 18, are the outcome of an
approach which has taken some considerable time and experimentation to
come to fruition; the mistakes made along the way are less frequently
reported. We conjecture that the time overrun described above is likely to
have a deleterious effect on quality. The cost of materials rises with time
(quite dramatically in some case study cities); if the total contract cost is
closely controlled (as is the case) and material costs have risen, then it is
conceivable that the contractor absorbs this by reducing the quality of work
to below that specified.
Clearly, cost and quality are closely interrelated. The routine application
of government procedure almost without fail selects the cheapest bid, which
in certain circumstances compromises the quality of the final product. An
apparently minor incident in Faisalabad (Box 9) draws the conflict between
cost and quality into sharp focus. The community group stated that it could
not afford the high specification for concrete sewer pipes which the govern-
ment specification requires. The government therefore states its position
that it cannot commit its share of the funds; the community responds that in
that case there will be no project, period. The community view prevailed in
this case, and the sewer project went ahead.
This is symptomatic of a highly controversial argument about levels of
service and design standards which has to be faced up to. Traditionally,
planners and engineers develop infrastructure schemes based on predefined
notions of what is best. These are reflected in the Codes of Practice and
Standards which are often unrealistically high and inappropriate for the
circumstances. In Faisalabad, people want a service which is within their
reach, built to standards which are appropriate for the circumstances, rather
than something which somebody else has decreed is better for them. This,
in fact, is no more than the sound approach which a supplier of consumer
goods takes; develop products which customers want and will buy. Stand-
ards can no longer be ‘absolute’ and applied in a vacuum without reference to
the customers.
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Wider benefits of community partnered procurement
Local infrastructure improvements are usually predicated on benefits to
environmental health. Our investigations lead us to believe that community
partnered procurement of infrastructure may enable much wider objectives
(in addition to the traditional environmental health benefits) to be achieved
through addressing the poverty agenda in relation to:
• the participation process as a means of offering empowerment and
greater control to households and community groups;
• employment opportunities leading to income generation for low income
groups who are paid for undertaking work associated with government
funded infrastructure improvements;
• small enterprise development as local micro-contractors develop and
exploit the niches created;
• other benefits to the local micro-economy such as increased business for
building materials suppliers.
The Sri Lankan experience (Boxes 18 and 19) demonstrate community
partnered procurement injecting substantial amounts of new money into the
local economy of low income communities in a way which is not welfare-
orientated. Different community groups respond in different ways, and
micro-contracting enterprises develop; two community groups undertook
32 per cent of the work in the NHDA community contracts in Sri Lanka. The
pilot projects in Cuttack and Cochin, India (Boxes 14 to 17) are showing
good potential. In these cases, government is either providing or acting as a
channel for the funding. In situations where communities themselves fund
the work internally (Boxes 7 to 9), existing money is recirculating. However,
whilst direct income generation is not a benefit here, there is evidence of
sustainable enterprise development through the strengthening of local
micro-contractors.
There is evidence of greater empowerment and control in all the cases we
reviewed. This is particularly noticeable where there has been the involve-
ment of a strong NGO (Boxes 7, 8, 12 and 13). Increased networking
between slum communities is another important impact (Box 12). There are
also a number of relatively minor instances which are nevertheless impor-
tant indicators of future potential. For example in Cuttack, India, (Box 17)
the community management group soon ceases to be a mere passive receiver
of ideas and instructions from the project management unit. The file reveals
an increasingly formal tone to their communications and they developed
sufficient confidence to question the actions of government through the
official channels.
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Some of these additional benefits, in particular income generation and
enterprise development, are not necessarily area-based; experience from
Pakistan and Sri Lanka supports this, although a more detailed impact
analysis which is beyond the scope of the current work is desirable. Through
community partnering it is possible to look beyond the physical slum into
different groups of the urban poor, where the skilled and unskilled labour
pool necessary to contribute to the infrastructure improvements almost
certainly exists. Implementing works through community partnering pro-
vides opportunities for targeting interventions in a way which integrates into
wider strategies of urban poverty reduction.
On the limited evidence available, the case for community partnering in
its broadest sense is strong. Not only does it apparently compete favourably
in terms of the traditional contractual performance measures of cost and
quality (although the time growth appears greater) it offers a whole range of
other potential benefits which can be targeted at low income groups to assist
their empowerment and improve their economic conditions. The problem is
the lack of a framework and tools which can be used to capture the diversity
of what appears to be happening in order to assess these potential impacts.
Constraints on community partnered procurement
Two distinct situations exist in the cases explored:
1. Community based actions outside of government which are supported by
NGOs.
2. Community based actions within the framework of a government pro-
gramme.
Both have similar problems in terms of developing a participation process.
However, in the first case, there is more or less total freedom in terms of
subsequent processes and procedures to move ahead with actions (in our
cases, infrastructure initiatives) which are outcomes of the participation
process (Box 7). In the second case, an additional set of problems stems from
attempts to develop these subsequent actions within the context of urban
government. This creates problems for community groups and government
officials alike. A recurring difficulty is the lack of capacity of the middle
ranking engineers within urban government, who have a central role in
community partnering schemes.
Considerable transaction costs are incurred by all involved . Community
groups invest a lot of their time during the development of the participation
process, and in gaining sufficient confidence to become involved in infra-
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structure procurement. This has been recognised by earlier work and can be
seen as part of a wider process of empowerment.
What has been less clearly stated is that during the early stages of
implementation, a lot of effort also has to be put in by government officials,
in complete disproportion to the engineering work in hand. The processes of
explaining the concepts, assessing the capacity of community groups, enter-
ing into negotiations and providing technical support during construction,
are all time consuming activities. This is evident in India (Boxes 16 and 17).
Once the initial stages are over and the programme develops further, serious
time constraints arise for the officials (Box 13). This is particularly important
for government engineers who usually have a quota of work (in financial
terms) which they are expected to handle in a particular year. However, in Sri
Lanka, which has the most extensive experience of community contracting,
once systems were in place and operating, there was not much difference in
supervision time between using conventional or community contractors
(Box 19).
Involving support organisations, whether private sector commercial or
NGO, as intermediaries clearly has advantages to offer in this respect.
However, it is important to keep the level of support in context with the work
in hand, even though there is clearly a need for a lot of support at the outset
of a new programme. This reflects in the management costs, which may be
considerable especially where international agencies are involved. (Box 9).
Even when local support organisations are involved, these costs can be
considerable. In one situation in Sri Lanka, consultancy costs paid to a NGO
amounted to 200 per cent of the contract cost for the actual infrastructure
works (Boxes 23 and 24). It is therefore important that monitoring and
evaluation procedures take these costs into account as part of the overall
impact assessment.
An important benefit of the tender contract system is that urban govern-
ment buys in the management capacity of the contractor as well as his
construction capacity (Box 10). Under Departmental Works Procedure
(Boxes 2 and 13), engineers and technicians experience difficulties in devoting
time to the supervision of labour and in ensuring that the correct materials are
available when required. The financial capacity of the contractor is important
because government operates on a cost reimbursement basis; this means that
any group acting in the capacity of a contractor must have access to ‘money
up front’ in order to purchase materials and pay the labour force. This created
problems in Sri Lanka and in India, where there were cases of government
officials taking out advances in their own name in order to provide pre-financing
to community groups. This situation is neither sustainable nor desirable.
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The quality of work resulting from community partnering arrangements is
generally perceived to be better than using conventional contractors. How-
ever, good quality work is not an automatic outcome; community groups and
micro-contractors alike need some form of on-the-job training and skills
upgrading. The apparently simple task of placing earth fill to form access
ways initially failed because of lack of experience and inadequate supervision
(Box 15). It is not reasonable to entrust community groups (or anybody else
for that matter) with tasks of which they have no previous experience, and
expect a quality product. In Pakistan (Boxes 7 and 8) NGO support for the
capacity building of community groups and micro contractors has been a very
important component of success.
There is a strong tendency for government engineering departments to
refuse to adopt any infrastructure which has not been constructed by them-
selves. This indicates a need for dialogue with the relevant government
departments from an early stage (Box 9).
Institutionalising community partnered procurement
Adopting non routine procedures clearly creates problems for government
officials. We have seen evidence of their discomfort and concern, largely as a
result of fear of the Audit and Account Organisation. Only in Sri Lanka do we see
a national organisational culture developing which is making positive efforts to
include these alternative ways of working into the mainstream. Also in Pakistan
the Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority has modified procedures (Box 25).
The Government of Sri Lanka conducted a thorough review of the system
of ‘awarding negotiated contracts to approved societies’; this included
auditing of a large number of contracts. The letters and Treasury Circulars
contain some of the most important innovations which we have found in
relation to government attitude to community based work (Boxes 20 to 22).
They have assimilated lessons of the ‘community contracting’ experience, in
particular the crucial role which negotiation plays; the rules now specifically
grant an exemption for awarding work to ‘approved societies’ through
negotiation without resorting to public tender. This recognises the fact that
very advantageous cost terms can be obtained by negotiation with community
groups. Our findings support this conclusion. This exemption should free
officials from the continual worry about how to demonstrate value for money
without a call for tenders, and should give them more opportunity to concentrate
on issues central to community partnering negotiations.
The fact that the system has passed through the Audit and Account
Organisation is significant and offers security to practitioners. As new
processes develop, and depending on the local circumstances, there may be
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advantages in informally contacting the auditors and obtaining an opinion,
rather than trying to disguise what is happening.
The NHDA of Sri Lanka has issued supporting guidelines for assigning
small contracts to community groups (Box 22). These are important not only
in themselves, but because they advertise the fact that assigning work to
community groups is part of the standard procedure of the organisation. This
is crucial to the way in which officials behave and should increase their
confidence in adopting new approaches. Much of the experience we report
from within government concerns small groups or individuals who have to
some extent gone out on a limb in order to promote community partnering;
there is a distinct sense of struggling against the prevailing flow. The
existence of clear procedural rules and guidelines indicates the commitment
of the organisation to these new approaches.
Photograph 4:
Community contractors construct a concrete lane, Cuttack, India
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Section 5
Guidelines for community
partnered procurement
The purpose of this section is to provide guidance on the involvement of
community groups in infrastructure procurement. We view partnering in
procurement as fitting in to a larger picture of community based activities
which are either being promoted as part of a programme involving urban
government, or are part of local initiatives facilitated and supported by
NGOs or other support organisations . We therefore assume that community
development activities are in place, and that the following guidelines will be
used to build on the outcomes of existing community mobilisation and the
development of participation within the community group. The issues raised
are derived from the cases presented in Section 3; hence these are quite
specific in that they relate to infrastructure procurement interventions, albeit
in a way which attempts to take a much wider view of the impact of
procurement.
These guidelines do not propose a step by step methodology leading to
guaranteed success; we are dealing with a process, and local circumstances
will dictate the precise details. This section is structured around the range of
possible roles and responsibilities adopted by the partners, with the guide-
lines presented as a series of discrete text boxes (Boxes G1 to G16). Cross
reference is made within these text boxes to the cases presented in section 3;
however, note that these cross references serve to illustrate problems as
much as solutions. The flow chart (Figure 5.1) guides the reader through the
sequence of text boxes.
Boxes G1 to G7 give guidance in relation to a set of generally applicable
key issues. These include the concepts underlying the approach of commu-
nity partnered procurement which places community groups at the centre of
activities, rather than at the periphery as is common in conventional procure-
ment. Successful partnerships can develop between different actors accord-
ing to local circumstances. It is important to perceive the actual procurement
of infrastructure as part of a much longer process, the key to which is
participatory planning of improvements to urban services. It is during this
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process that the potential roles which community groups can play in
procurement will develop; the key outcome of the participatory planning is
the generation of one or more micro contracts. Whilst we have found that
community groups have become involved in quite complex procurement
arrangements, it is important to be realistic about the scope of the work and
we characterise typical works which have been successful. Clearly, the
identification and adoption of specific roles is dependent upon the capacity
to undertake associated activities and we suggest certain indicators. How-
ever, this opens up a whole field which is outside the scope of this work,
namely how to support and build on the existing capacity so that community
groups are able to grow into new and different roles. The organisational
status of community groups, whether informal or registered, is significant if
urban government is a partner.
In Box G8, we identify the source of finance for infrastructure improve-
ments as an important signpost to the various procedural routes which are
available; from this point onwards, the guidelines identify particular text
boxes with specific roles.
The Community as Full Promoter pays the total cost of the assets (infra-
structure) created. Whilst there are no formal procedural requirements,
guidance on preparing to enter into an agreement and on selecting a contract
is suggested. Should a written contract be adopted, this leads to further
guidance points on negotiation, documentation and sample agreements.
The Community as Partial Promoter pays some but not all of the costs of
the assets. We have found that the non-community contribution comes either
from or via urban government, even if it is channelled through an interme-
diary. In this case the guidelines follow government procedure in relation to
project approval and procurement mechanisms and include estimating the
cost of the works and access to finance. The preparations for entering into
agreements are crucial; the guidance offered here is in common with other
potential community roles, as are selecting and negotiating a contract. We
have also identified a number of issues which are relevant when construction
work is underway.
The Community as Engineer is involved in supervision, monitoring and
quality control of the construction, in addition to contributing to the engineering
related activities during participatory planning. The guidelines on preparing to
enter into an agreement are particularly relevant in that responsibilities and
delegated authorities need to be clear, especially if the other parties are urban
government and micro contractors who are used to working only in a conven-
tional situation. The guidelines on selecting and negotiating contracts and
documentation incorporate the need to make these responsibilities clear.
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The Community as Contractor undertakes the provision and management
of construction in accordance with the contract. Urban government will
almost certainly be a partner, so the guidance on selecting appropriate
procedures is extremely important given the potentially high risks which
community groups may take. This is also reflected in the guidelines on cost
estimation and access to finance. The importance of the guidance on
preparing to enter agreements also applies here. The guidance on selecting
and negotiating contracts and documentation is supplemented by a sample
agreement, and the examples of actual contracts which are presented should
also be referred to (Boxes 27 – 30).
Photograph 5:
PMU staff offer technical support to community contractors, Cuttack, India
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Figure 5.1. Using the guidelines
Route 3: Community as engineer
Box G11 Preparing to enter into agreements
Box G12 Selecting a contract type
Box G13 Negotiating a contract
Box G14 Documentation
Box G16 Managing community partnered
micro contracts
Key issues in community partnered
procurement
Box G1 Community partnering
Box G2 Identifying the partners
Box G3 A planning process for Infrastructure
Box G4 Roles for community groups
Box G5 Scope for partnering in procurement
Box G6 Identifying capacity for different roles
Box G7 Organisational status of community
groups
Box G8 Identifying appropriate procedures
Route 1: Community as full promoter
Box G11 Preparing to enter into agreements
Box G12 Selecting a contract type
If a written contract is selected then also:
Box G13 Negotiating a contract
Box G14 Documentation
Box G15 Sample form of agreement
Route 2: Community as partial promoter
Box G9 Identifying procedures in urban
government
Box G10 Cost estimation and access to
Finance
Box G11 Preparing to enter into agreements
Box G12 Selecting a contract type
Box G13 Negotiating a contract
Box G14 Documentation
Box G15 Sample form of agreement
Box G16 Managing community partnered
micro contracts
Route 4: Community as contractor
Box G9 Identifying procedures in urban
government
Box G10 Cost estimation and access to
finance
Box G11 Preparing to enter into agreements
Box G12 Selecting a contract type
Box G13 Negotiating a contract
Box G14 Documentation
Box G15 Sample form of agreement
Box G16 Managing community partnered
micro contracts
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Box G1. Community partnering
The concept of Community Partnering embraces the variety of roles and responsibilities
described in Section 2. It reflects the continued involvement of people with the planning,
implementation and sustenance of local infrastructure and service improvements, and
with income generation, enterprise development and skills training. This implies:
• full acceptance of the urban poor as primary stakeholders in local infrastructure
provision;
• developing longer term more open-ended relationships, encompassing joint
financing, planning, design, implementation, hand over and maintenance;
• promoting co-operation both formally and informally with government agencies
and NGOs;
• wider targeting of the urban poor, rather than solely area-based dwellers in
specific slums, as local inhabitants do not necessarily carry out improvement
works themselves because of lack of both time and relevant skills.
Photograph 6:
Community management of sewer construction, Faisalabad, Pakistan
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Box G2. Identifying the partners
• Community Groups.
• Urban Government.
• Non Government Organisations (NGOs).
• Local micro contractors.
There are clearly a number of ways in which partnerships can form between a
community group and one or more of these actors. The key point is that there is no
sense in prescribing who the partners should be; our evidence does not point to a single
universal model, but suggests that it is the highly specific local context and circumstances
which determines the best way forwards.
The role of urban government can be either direct or indirect. In the latter case, we have
found cases where a NGO is appointed as an intermediary either directly on behalf of
government, or on behalf of international donor agencies who themselves are working
through government. We treat these situations as if urban government were directly
involved.
Box G3. A planning process for infrastructure
The process of developing partnerships will start well before it is time to consider
procurement activities. Unless community groups have been involved throughout the
planning process it is unlikely that partnering in procurement will be successful. The
following summary outlines steps in a participatory infrastructure planning approach.
• Consultations between partners to ascertain demand for improved services.
• Outline options for service improvements.
• Estimate indicative costs of different options.
• Consider the operation and maintenance implications of different options.
• Explore alternatives for financing infrastructure improvements.
• Select options for service improvements.
• Preliminary planning of infrastructure improvements.
• Identify micro contracts associated with the infrastructure plan.
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Box G4. Roles for community groups
We have already commented on the variety and complexity of roles and responsibilities
which community groups have taken on. External factors, particularly the extent and
source of funding for infrastructure improvements have an important influence on the
eventual roles adopted. In summary the following roles can be played either fully or
partially:
Promoter/Client (Boxes 7, 8, 9)
• Partial or full financiers and managers of the assets created.
Engineer (Boxes 10, 11, 12)
• Involved in information provision, planning, design, monitoring and evaluation.
Contractor (Boxes 14, 15, 16, 17, 18)
• Labour supplier only (Boxes 14, 15).
• Labour and material suppliers (Box 16).
• Sub-contractor.
• Main contractor (Boxes 17, 18).
Box G5. Scope for partnering in procurement
We have now reached the key stage for developing a specific procurement strategy.
• The project/programme generates one or more micro contracts.
However, not all work is suitable for community partnered procurement; potential micro
contracts need the following characteristics:
• Low risk, low hazard.
• Technically and managerially straightforward.
• Labour intensive.
• Not requiring highly specialised skills.
Some examples of typical works:
• Excavation (pipeline/sewer trenching, foundations).
• Earth and gravel filling (land reclamation, road formation).
• Simple masonry and concrete work (paving, single storey buildings, latrines,
solid waste bins, water points, bathing enclosures, manholes).
• Pipe laying and plumbing (water reticulation, sewer lines, water points,
manholes).
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Box G6. Identifying capacity for different roles
Assigning mutually agreed roles amongst the different partners requires an assessment
of each other’s capacity to perform. Capacities in different areas are required.
• Technical: for community as construction contractor or engineer; urban
government and/or NGOs as technical facilitators.
• Financial: for community and/or NGOs as total or partial promoters.
• Managerial: important for all partners and all roles.
There are important indicators to look for and potential activities to support within the
community when considering different roles. For example:
• Residents who are experienced skilled construction workers; they play a key
role in managing the construction process as well as contributing their artisan
skills. They have the potential to act as trainers and demonstrators.
• Residents who operate as local entrepreneurs surviving in the local economy,
but not necessarily in construction, can assist in organising the business
development side.
• The ability to raise and handle money for collective activity; the urban poor can
be good financiers. Community groups may not have experience of bank
transaction; individual or joint personal accounts are easier to open than
company accounts.
• The management of past and existing community based activities. How
transparent is the decision making process; are disadvantaged groups part of
the decisions or are they simply passive listeners?
• Can it be demonstrated that a decision was taken in the good faith if it goes
wrong. This could be facilitated by keeping a record of the factors and the
risks considered at the time of the decision making.
• Evidence of financial and management accountability in community groups/
NGOs: can expenditure be traced.
Note: Some traditional indicators used in evaluating the capacities of conventional
registered contractors may not be relevant when considering the community as a
potential contractor. Examples include: evidence of financial strength from bank
accounts; numbers of people permanently employed; inventory of plants and tools
owned.
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Box G7. The organisational status of community groups
The status of community groups and community based organisations (CBOs) is
relevant if urban government is involved. Broadly speaking, there are mechanisms
through which community groups can become registered and thereby be legally
recognised by government in its dealings with them. This applies to NGOs as well. The
situation becomes more complex if the community group has no clear legal status; it
may be difficult for urban government to procure services from neighbourhood level
informal organisations. In the latter case there are a number of possible approaches:
• Keep the relationship on a personal level; the legal status of the organisation
will not arise so long as urban government or private sector organisations can
enter into a contract with a person or group of people (Box 13).
• See if the informal status can be upgraded through local urban bye-laws as
was done with Community Development Councils in Sri Lanka.
• Treat the relationship as a special case or experiment and obtain special
approval from the appropriate authorities in urban government (Boxes 9, 13).
• Keep a direct relationship between urban government and the community
group out of the design of the project and use intermediaries such as NGOs
(Boxes 8, 12).
The problem is that registering community groups can involve lengthy bureaucratic
processes. However, the advantages lie in having the status to develop relationships
with urban government and to develop small enterprises.
Box G8. Identifying appropriate procedures
The source of funds for the infrastructure improvements has an important influence on
the procedures which are available and the flexibility of the approaches adopted.
• If urban government is not involved, it is not necessary to follow formal
procedures, and matters may progress on the basis of verbal (i.e. unwritten)
agreements. However, if there is the prospect of linking in to the resources of
urban government in the future, it is a good idea to mirror their procedures so
that it becomes possible to slot into a programme as and when appropriate.
The procedures themselves are logical and if followed in the spirit of partnering
will help to maintain transparency and accountability; the difference may be the
extent to which written records are kept.
• If part or all of the finance originates or is channelled through urban government,
follow their procedures for obtaining the necessary sanctions and award of the
micro contract. This also holds true for projects or programmes which work
through NGO intermediaries.
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Box G9. Identifying procedures in urban government
The first stage is to obtain approval to undertake the work (Box 1).
• Micro contracts are identified through participatory infrastructure planning.
• Preliminary cost estimates are prepared.
• Estimates are granted administrative approval by the Engineering Department
in urban government.
• Detailed plans including surveys and designs are drawn up by the partners.
• Detailed cost estimates are prepared on the basis of these plans.
• These estimates are granted technical sanction by the appropriate officials in
the ED.
• The work is awarded in accordance with one of the procedures outlined below.
In the case of community as partial promoter, this process can be undertaken by
constituting a Project Approval Committee comprising all stakeholders, which has
specific and clearly delegated authority to approve both the community’s and urban
government’s contribution towards expenditure on micro contracts up to an agreed
financial limit (Box 9).
The second stage is to select a procedure for awarding the work. Find out to which rules
the concerned department of urban government operates and check to see which
options are available. These rules may be national or state level and the detail may well
vary from place to place within the same country. Common generic examples include
the rules of the Public Works Department and the Municipal Department. The following
procedures will typically be available.
• Entrustment of Works by Negotiation; registered organisations are entrusted to
carry out the works up to a certain value (Boxes 16, 17, 18, 19, 21) This is the
most flexible option and is likely to cause the least problems for the Engineering
Department staff (Box 15). Rates for the work are negotiated between:
- the micro contractor and the Project Approval Committee if the community is
partial promoter;
- the community and the Engineering Department if the community is the
contractor.
• Departmental Works executed directly through employing daily skilled and
unskilled labour from the community. Onerous for staff to supervise (Box 13).
• Labour Contract: the Department arranges for construction materials to be
available at the site; the community group provides local labour to a micro
contractor (Box 14), or alternatively becomes labour contractor (Box 15).
• Piece work agreements and Work Orders may be used for very small works,
up to about Rs 2000-3000 at the discretion of the Engineer. May be a useful
entry point but the financial limit very low for widespread adoption
• Cooperative Societies formed for the purposes of undertaking minor works.
Government may be empowered to award a certain quota of work at a
discount on the tender price. This depends on local criteria.
• Award of the work using the system of competitive tender (Box 3). This is
unlikely to be appropriate if the community group is the contractor, due to
barriers of contractor enlistment and financial capacity (Box 5).
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Box G10. Cost estimation and access to finance
If the community group is either the full or partial promoter, or the contractor, it will have
to:
• prepare cost estimates;
• consider access to finance;
• be prepared to enter in to negotiations.
The basis for cost estimation when government is involved is the Schedule of Rates;
however, the real cost depends upon the prevailing market rates and these rates should
be used to estimate the likely cost of the work (Box 6). If the community is the promoter,
these are used as the benchmark for negotiating with the micro contractor and ensuring
money is efficiently spent. The finance provided by both the community and urban
government must be accessible to pay the micro contractors.
If the community is the contractor, the actual procurement procedure adopted determines
the requirements for pricing the work and the need for finance.
Departmental Works; Labour Contract; Piece work agreements and Work Orders.
• Estimate rates for skilled and unskilled labour.
• Access to finance is not a problem; labour is paid in arrears.
Entrustment of Works by Negotiation; Cooperative Societies; Competitive tender
• Estimate cost for completing construction of the works as specified, including:
all labour; purchase, carriage and storage of materials; management time
including record keeping.
• Require access to finance for ‘up front’ purchase of materials prior to settle-
ment of the first invoice by urban government, or an arrangement with them
for advance payment to cover the ‘up front’ costs (Boxes 16, 17).
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Box G11. Preparing to enter into agreements
Prior to entering an agreement, which may include drafting and signing a contract, it is
important that all parties enter into discussions during a joint workshop to clarify a
number of important issues in order to avoid misunderstandings and difficulties during
the implementation. The clear message is that we are partners and want to negotiate
the basic conditions of our relationships. All of the following points are crucial, whether
the community is the promoter, the engineer or the contractor.
We need clarity about responsibilities.
• Use simple and clear language so that everyone understands to what they
are about to agree; the outcomes should be incorporated as far as is possible.
• Clarify who will be responsible for the operation and maintenance of the
infrastructure and who will own the assets created (Boxes 7, 13, 23).
• How and by whom will physical progress and quality of work be monitored and
approved (Box 12).
• What are the bonuses and damages for completion before and after the
contract time.
• How is the completed work to be handed over.
• How will disputes be resolved.
We need clarity about money.
• Who is paying the bills. Urban government has fixed disbursement procedures
even if it is only partial financier.
• If joint financing is involved, what are the mechanisms to deal with the joint
operation of the accounts. Unless clear instructions and authorisations can be
agreed, avoid joint bank accounts.
• What are the mechanisms for channelling the money: submission and payment
of bills for certified work; how to request an advance (if appropriate) against
particular items; settlement of advances.
• Will there be compensation if the bills are not paid on time. The time required to
pay a bill should not be more than 14 days.
• What are the audit and account requirements and how can they be incorporated
into the process.
• Who is accountable to whom; what are the liabilities and responsibilities.
We need clarity if a contract is involved.
• All signatories must understand what they are signing for.
• Who are the parties to the contract.
• What are the sole and joint responsibilities of the parties involved.
• What will be the value of the contract.
• What will be the duration of the contract.
• What securities are required and why; this could include personal securities,
but wherever possible do not ask for earnest money and performance guarantees.
• How can the partners terminate the contract and for what reasons.
• Who will actually sign the contract and under what delegated authority.
• Are the parties clear about the enforcement of the contract; is it to be court
ordered or private ordered.
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Box G12. Selecting a contract type
• Legal contracts are designed to be enforced by court ordering and need to be
used if urban government is involved.
• Relational contracts rely on self-enforcement or ‘private ordering’.
This leads to several options:
• Verbal contract: generally the mode in the informal sector; also common in
formal sector sub-contracting. If Specified, there is a mutual verbal agreement
between the stakeholders. If Unspecified, there is no specific verbal agree-
ment, but an understanding exists between the stakeholders as to their
expected roles.
• Written informal contracts: a simple legal contract, for example as used in
Departmental Works in SKAA Pakistan. (Box 28)
• Written formal contracts: typified by the standard contracts used by urban
government in the tender contract method of procurement. Non-standard
conditions may be tailored to the requirement of the different stakeholders.
Whether legal or relational contracts are used, it is important to ensure clarity with
respect to roles and responsibilities.
• Are the contractors literate or do they have the access to somebody who could
read and translate the documents? If yes, a written contract could be used; if
no, contract conditions must be specified verbally.
• Are the potential contractors used to working with any particular type of
contract? If yes, consider building on the existing practices.
• Is the contract likely to be enforced by court ordering? If no, an informal
contract could be adopted; if yes, either legal assistance may be required or in
the case of urban government standard contracts and conditions can be used.
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Box G13. Negotiating a contract
It is customary that the promoter specifies or drafts the conditions of contract; the
contractor is asked to work as per the contract conditions. In the case of partnering, the
conditions of contract need to be used as a working document. The following issues
need to be discussed between the partners during negotiation regardless of the type
of contract to be adopted.
• Definitions as appropriate: terms such as ‘Engineers’, ‘Contractors’ and
‘Clients’ need explanation in the context of the contract.
• Intentions of the partners.
• The contract documents.
• The contractors obligations.
• The employers duties.
• Commencements and completion.
• Defect liability.
• Control of the works.
• Employers Instructions.
• Variations.
• Sureties and advances.
• Payments.
• Statutory Obligations.
• Injury to persons and property; indemnity to Employer; Insurance.
• Settlement of disputes: reference to the law in the case of court ordered
contracts.
G
ui
de
lin
es
Insides - main text home 1.pmd 31/01/2003, 09:4138
39
Box G14. Documentation
The requirements of the documents are determined by the type of contract used.
Obviously in a verbal contract, no documentation is involved. On the other hand a
formal contract may involve a whole variety of documents. The obvious but nevertheless
key point is that they must be comprehensible to all the partners involved.
The documents can be classified according to the stage of the contract.
• Before the contract is awarded including the tender documents.
• Documents that become part of the contract.
• Documents used in managing the contract.
• Documents used in closing the contract.
A typical formal contract contains the following documents:
• Instructions to the potential contractor.
• Conditions of contract.
• Specifications.
• Bill of quantities or schedule of rates or reference to those.
• Form of agreement.
• Drawings and plans.
• Sureties and insurance requirements, if any.
• Mechanism of evaluation of the tender or offer.
Preparing Documents
• Keep the language simple and clear. One or other party may not be literate and
have no legal background. If the chances of going to a court of law are remote
(as is the norm in micro contracts), do not write the contract solely for the
purposes of litigation.
• Are the documents clear enough for a community group to reasonably cost the
works and services for which it is bidding.
• Are the documents compatible with the custom that the local micro contractors
and artisans are used to working with. For example, they may only be familiar
with bidding on a percentage rate basis.
• Give the contract documents a managerial function, including communication of
what is to be done (Boxes 6, 7, 26 – 30).
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Box G15. Sample form of agreement
Note that in cases involving urban government, whilst it is theoretically possible to have
simple documentation, we have found that in practice it usually resembles that used
as a matter of course in routine procurement (Box 27, 29). The form of agreement can
be very simple, as the conditions of contract can form a separate document. For
contracts not intended primarily for court ordering the language of the form can be
tailored to local custom and language. However, in many government departments, the
forms are prescribed.
THIS AGREEMENT is made on  [date]  between  [Name of a partner]  and  [other
partner/s].
The partner  [Name of the partner]  will act as  [Role]  and partner  [Name]  will act as
[Role].
The addresses of the partners are as follows:  [List the complete addresses and contact
numbers if any].
WHEREAS it is mutually agreed between the partners to carry out the following [Briefly
describe the work].
The contractor shall perform and complete the work/service for the payment made by
the Client within  [mention contract duration]. The work shall be carried out according
to the [refer to the conditions of contract]. The following documents are part of the
contract [list the documents, if any].
SIGNATURES OF THE PARTNERS with full names.
SIGNATURES OF TWO WITNESSES
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Box G16. Managing community partnered micro contracts
The right atmosphere
Government officials are likely to be challenged and questioned by the community,
which may engender some anxiety in the officials. In any novel process, all partners
need support and training; an atmosphere of mutual respect and support is required
which allows for flexibility as there are no hard and fast rules of management. As we
have seen in Sri Lanka, good working relations can develop between community
groups and officials, with empowerment through the assumption of power and the
delegation of authority. Officials have and could trust community partners in a way they
do not trust many of their conventional contractors.
An open ended process
This process of procurement has wider objectives than the production of goods or the
delivery of services. Even though a contract has discrete start and completion dates,
community development, empowerment and poverty alleviation are longer term and
open ended. The impact of community partnered procurement is likely to continue after
the completion of the infrastructure works. Operation and maintenance of the services
is one mechanism for sustaining further involvement.
Irregular inputs
The internal resources available within a community vary from one situation to another.
People are likely to be working elsewhere and may only be available during evenings
or weekends. On the other hand government officials generally work regular hours. A
flexible timing approach for the key officials working on community partnered procurement
may be required.
Informal and formal positions
Many artisans, who may have a key role in this process, although well experienced may
lack formal qualifications. Government officials are professionally qualified and formally
trained people and their position attracts a particular status in society. This difference
in background may put a strain on the communication channel between the two;
officials need to understand the language and way of working of artisans.
Guidance not policing
A community has nothing to gain and everything to lose if it produces poor quality work;
in terms of quality, there is an alignment of the goals of the community and the
government officials. In a conventional situation, construction supervisors are policing
the contractors. In community partnered procurement the community groups need
guidance and support; thus these relatively junior officials have a crucial role at the
operational level and much depends upon them and the support which they in turn
receive.
Monitoring
We have found little data on the productivity even of conventionally procured construction
works. It is crucial to keep good records related to community partnered contracts in
order to monitor performance, continually strive for higher standards of quality, and
build up a base of experience which can be used as a sound basis for future estimation.
G
uidelines
Insides - main text home 1.pmd 31/01/2003, 09:4141
42
G
ui
de
lin
es
Insides - main text home 1.pmd 31/01/2003, 09:4142
43
Annex 1
Text boxes relating to community partnered
procurement of urban infrastructure.
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Box 1 Procurement procedure in Engineering Departments of Urban Government
Box 2 Urban Government Procedures for awarding work to construct infrastructure
Box 3 Urban Government arrangements for awarding contracts through competitive tendering
Box 4 Who is allowed to bid for Urban Government Engineering works?
Box 5 Administrative and financial demands made on contractors by Urban Government
Box 6 The problem with Cost Estimates: who uses which cost?
Box 7 Working without government: community as promoter.
Box 8 Community as promoter, government facilitates
Box 9 Community as partial promoter
Box 10 Community as advisers
Box 11 Community as partial Engineer
Box 12 Community and NGO monitor a large Government contract:
Box 13 Use of Departmental Works Procedure
Box 14 Community supplies labour to a private sector contractor.
Box 15 Community as a labour-only contractor for government.
Box 16 Community as contractors for urban government (Cochin).
Box 17 Community as contractors for urban government (Cuttack).
Box 18 Communities as contractor and manager for 150 government contracts.
Box 19 The community contracting process in the NHDA, Sri Lanka
Box 20 The Government of Sri Lanka reviews and assimilates community management  and
contracting
Box 21 Government of Sri Lanka formally recognises community management and contracting
Box 22 NHDA Guidelines for community management and contracting
Box 23 A more complex process involving the Community, NGO and a Governmental
Project Unit
Box 24 Is the client getting value for money; the cost of intermediaries
Box 25 A modified process of Departmental Works using NGO as consultants
Box 26 Conditions of contract for community construction contracts with  NHDA Sri Lanka.
Box 27 The community construction contract in Cuttack, India.
Box 28 The contract used in the Departmental Works of SKAA
Box 29 A contract between three parties with a NGO as the partial Consultant and partial
Contractor.
Box 30 The contract used in the FAUP, Faisalabad, Pakistan
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Boxes 1 to 6 describe the conventional procurement procedures which are widely used by
urban government in South Asia.
Box 1. Procurement procedure in engineering departments of
urban government
This procedure stems from the Public Works Departments (PWD), and its principles
are used by most government implementing agencies.
Narrative
1. Formulation of a scheme and its require-
ments need not necessarily be done by the
Engineering Department (ED); the ED
procurement procedure starts once the
requirements of the scheme have been put
before it, regardless of their origin.
2. Preliminary cost estimates are prepared.
3. These estimates are approved by the ED;
this is termed  administrative approval.
4. The necessary surveys, plans and designs
are drawn up by the ED engineers.
5. Detailed cost estimates are prepared on
the basis of these plans (Box 6).
6. These estimates are approved by the
appropriate officials in the ED; this usually
involves the Chief Engineer; this is termed
technical sanction.
7. The work is awarded;  there are a number
of options available for implementing
construction of the infrastructure (Box 2).
8. Completion of construction and finalisation
of work.
9. Completion and end of the defect liability
period.
Commentary
• In general, the basis here is
‘rule of thumb’ and past data.
• The basis of these cost
estimates is the government
approved Schedule of Rates
(SoR) and approved details.
PWD is the main source of
reference.
• The preference is always for
competitive bidding.
• Marked by the last entry of the
measurement book, as
reflected in the completion
certificate.
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Narrative
1. Award of the work to a private sector
contractor using the system of competitive
tender  (Box 3). Tenders are usually
submitted on a ‘percentage plus’ basis;
that is, rather than fill in his own rate for
each item of work, the contractor takes the
engineers’ estimate as per the government
schedule of rates and adds on a percentage
of the total. This percentage has to include
his own profit, but more importantly it must
also allow for the difference between the
schedule of rates and the actual market
rates for materials and labour.
2. Departmental Works  in which work may be
executed directly by the ED through
employing daily skilled and unskilled labour.
A muster roll of the labourers has to be
maintained.  The materials required are
issued from the government store by indent
or purchase directly chargeable to an
authorised agent.
3. Piece work agreements and Work Orders
are strictly ‘contract types’; they are
included here as they can be used for very
small works, up to about Rs 2000-3000.
They can be undertaken at the discretion of
the Engineer and do not have to be
submitted to such lengthy procedures as
larger contracts.
4. Entrustment of Works by Negotiation;
registered voluntary organisations or
cooperatives engaged in ‘social service’ or
‘local improvement efforts’, or one or more
‘beneficiaries of works’ may be entrusted to
carry out the works. The ED  negotiates
rates.
5. Cooperative Societies can be formed for the
purposes of undertaking minor works.
These exist in India; examples are ‘unem-
ployed engineers’ and ‘labour’ cooperatives.
Commentary
• This is the routine method of
procurement used in almost
all situations.
• The wording of the items are
standard; experienced
contractors know what is
and is not included in the
SoR, and often do not
consult it.
• This is now generally limited
to maintenance work.
• This has very limited use.
The responsible Engineer
must show that adopting
negotiation does not
increase the cost above,
that which would result from
tendering, and that unusual
circumstances warranted
the procedure.
Box 2. Urban government procedures for awarding work to
construct infrastructure
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...Box 2. Continued
Narrative
In some cases the ED is empowered to
award a certain quota of work at a discount
which can be as much as 10 per cent off the
tender price.
6. Labour Contract: the ED arranges for
construction materials to be available at the
site; the labour contractor hires the neces-
sary labour and undertakes to carry out the
work. Payment is based on the measured
quantity of work carried out.
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Box 3. Urban government arrangements for awarding contracts
through competitive tendering
Narrative
1. ED issues a tender notice, either by
advertising in the press or placing a notice
on a notice board, which  invites a sealed
tender for the advertised works. For larger
contracts, provincial government may do
this on behalf of municipalities.
2. This notice specifies the earnest money
deposit, security money (Box 5), estimated
cost, date and time for the submission of
tenders. Box 4 describes the requirements
for prospective tenderers.
3. Tenders are opened at the specified date
and time by the officer inviting tenders or
by his authorised agent, in the presence of
the contractor or their agents.
4. Tenders are serially numbered, signed by
the officer opening the tenders and the
rates are read out.
5. A comparative statement is prepared.
6. The tenders together with the comparative
statement with the recommendations of
the Assistant Engineer or Sub-Divisional
Engineer or Executive Engineer are sent to
the competent authority for accepting the
tender. Usually the lowest tender is
accepted but the lowest tender may not be
accepted if the capacity of the contractor is
doubted or his record of previous work is
not satisfactory, or for other valid reasons.
Depending upon their rank, government
engineers and officials have the authority
to accept tenders up to a certain amount.
7. After the tender is accepted the contractor
deposits the security money.
8. A work order authorising commencement
of the works is given to the contractor, and
all the tender papers are page numbered
and indexed.
9. A contract bond or agreement is prepared
and sealed and kept in safe custody.
Commentary
• The decision is based on the
value of the work. Beyond a
certain value the tender has to
be advertised. The advertise-
ment has to be processed
through a central body, which
takes time.
• ‘Tender boxes’ are still used
in some departments.
• A board which generally
includes a representative from
the accounts section is
responsible for opening the
tenders.
• Rejecting the lowest bidder
puts the onus on the rejecting
officer. The main issues is to
explain why, in absence of
mistakes in the contractors
offer, the department should
be deprived of the benefit of
the lowest cost.
• The case for rejection
becomes very hard to make, if
it is done subsequent to
enlistment or prequalification
of the contractor, who is
thereby deemed suitable to
bid.
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Box 4. Who is allowed to bid for urban government
engineering works?
Narrative
1. The ED operates a system whereby only
those contractors who are enlisted can
submit tenders.
2. The contractors are enlisted within a
particular class (usually four or five) which
specifies the financial limit of the works for
which they are deemed competent to bid.
Box 5 describes the administrative
requirements.
3. The requirements of enlistment are to
demonstrate capacity in terms of experi-
ence, financial credentials, tools and
equipment owned, and personnel em-
ployed.
4. The contractors are enlisted for a particular
duration and are required to pay an
enlistment fee.
5. In general if a contractor is already working
in one department it is relatively easy to
work in other departments. Conversely if a
contractor does not perform well in one
department, he can be banned from other
departments. In Sri Lanka, contractors
may be required to attend training courses.
6. In large scale works, potential bidders are
selected for the one project only;  this
process of prequalification is similar to that
of enlistment.
Commentary
• The requirements are
demonstrated by submitting
relevant documents.
• Litigation against the depart-
ment is one of the reasons for
‘blacklisting’ a contractor.
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Box 5. Administrative and financial demands made on contractors
by urban government
Narrative
1. Earnest money (2 per cent - 3 per
cent  of the tender value) must be
deposited.
2. A performance bond for small works
may or may not be required. A
typical bond value is 10 per cent of
the contract value and it is released
after the end of defect liability
period.
3. Insurance is not usually required for
small works.
4. On acceptance of the tender, the
contractor has to deposit typically
10 per cent of the tendered amount
as security money with the
department. This is inclusive of the
earnest money already deposited.
In some cases the money is
deducted from the running bills. All
money is released at the end of the
defect liability period.
5. Liquidated damages can be
imposed in the event of serious time
overrun.
Commentary
• No study has been carried out on the
frequencies of accidents or claims for
small works.
• These demands have high associated
costs which may reach over 25 per
cent; this can create serious problems
in arranging finance. The ultimate
cost of this is borne by the client;
it is reflected in the tender prices.
• Generally used as a bargaining tool.
Actual incidences of imposition are
negligible.
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Box 6. The problem with cost estimates: who uses which cost?
Narrative
1. Government engineers prepare
detailed cost estimates for
technical sanction.
2. These estimates have to be
based on the latest edition of a
Schedule of Rates (SoR)
provided by the Public Works
Department.
3. The SoR is updated periodically;
the problem is that in practice
many years may elapse
between updates.
4. The cost estimates which are
given technical sanction do not
reflect the actual cost of
procuring the works unless the
SoR is up to date.
5. The market rate for doing the
work is therefore nearly always
greater than the engineers’ cost
estimate.
6. Prices tendered for work have to
reflect the market rate.
Commentary
• This provides a standard basis for
tendering (Box 2).
• High construction cost inflation means
that the estimates rapidly become
unrealistic.
• If the actual cost of a contract increases
beyond a certain limit then the approval
process (Box 1) has to be repeated.
• In one extreme case, the SoR was over
15 years old, with tender prices coming in
at many times the estimated value.
• These estimates serve no purpose in
terms of managing the work for the
contractor.
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Box 7. Working without government: community as promoter
The community, a NGO and artisans work together in the Orangi Pilot Project internal
works, Karachi, Pakistan.
Narrative
1. Residents collected money and paid in full
for sewers along their lanes. At first this was
done without any technical support from
professionals.
2. Subsequently a NGO provided technical
assistance in terms of cost estimation,
supervision and provision of formwork.
Training was provided for masons.
3. Some of these trained masons lobbied for
more work in the neighbouring lanes and
started specialising in similar works. They
formed  work-gangs and undertook a lot of
lane sanitation work.
4. The rates were negotiated on the basis of
the estimation provided by the NGO, which
was based on the prevailing market rates.
5. The estimation gives a breakdown of the
labour and material for ease of ordering.
6. The material was purchased by the
community.
7. For excavation work, specialist labourers
were usually hired; in some cases the work
was done by the residents.
8. For concrete work, a mason was generally
hired on either a lump sum or item rate-
basis.
9. Maintenance was done by the residents; if
the problems were simple. In the case of
major problems they lobby and seek help.
10. There was no written contract involved.
Disputes were resolved through ‘social
pressure’.
Boxes 7 to 18 focus on the variety of roles played by community groups in the
procurement process.
Commentary
• A genuine demand for the
service already exists.
• Evidence of enterprise
development.
• A system of estimation and
breakdown of rates which
suits its purpose; see Box 6.
• In urban communities the
assumption that the user will
supply the labour may not
hold good. Contracting
specialisation  is evident.
• This leads to problems; urban
government is unwilling to
adopt infrastructure which it
has had no part in supplying.
• ‘Private Ordering’ as
compared to ‘Court Ordering’
is the preferred mechanism of
dispute resolution.
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Box 8. Community as promoter, government facilitates
In some internal works of the Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority in Karachi, Pakistan, a NGO
and State Government act as facilitators: there is no role for urban government.
Narrative
1. The state government department with
responsibility to regularise and upgrade
slums initially entrusted implementation to
urban government.
2. Progress was  slow, the  quality of the work
was poor and there were problems with cost
escalation.
3. A new, dynamic leader changed the way the
government department worked.
4. All the lane level work is now done by the
local people themselves with technical
assistance from a NGO. The people finance
the improvements themselves.
5. The NGO is paid by the government
department for community organisation and
technical guidance. For internal (lane-level
work) works that is the only contribution
from the state.
Commentary
• Public sector department at
provincial level deals with the
regularisation and upgrading
of Katchi abadis.
• This is a rare instance of a
public sector department
experimenting with procure-
ment procedures.
• It has formally contracted an
NGO in a capacity similar to
an engineering consultant.
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Box 9. Community as partial promoter
The community and government are facilitated by a private consultant funded by a
donor: A project management unit (PMU) was set up in the Faisalabad Development
Authority (FDA) to implement an integrated development project known as the
Faisalabad Area Upgrading Project (FAUP). The local PMU staff were supported by
expatriate consultants appointed by the donor agency.
Narrative
1. Local infrastructure improvements
are funded 50 per cent by the
residents and 50 per cent through
the PMU, using donor agency
funds.
2. A project to construct lane sewers
was identified through community
meetings; community mapping was
carried out.
3. Committees were formed at area
and lane levels, and for the
implementation of the project. The
lane (about 20-40 households) is an
important unit and the lane commit-
tee typically involves 3-6. people.
4. The PMU staff designed the works
partly to government standards.
5. The design was discussed with the
lane committee. The main problem
was the high cost; residents could
not afford the specification for
reinforced concrete pipes required
by government. Cheaper pipes
having a lower standard of rein-
forcement were obtained from the
local market place.
6. The PMU have negotiated with the
local manufacturers to try to ensure
certain minimum standards in their
pipe production. Modifications were
made to improve the standard of
manholes.
7. Cost estimates were prepared by
the PMU according to both the SoR
and market rates. The rates
Commentary
• A conventional survey was also done
as the information collected in the
mapping exercise ‘was not considered
proper’ for Engineering purposes.
• The committees are informal and are
not registered societies; there is no
formal mechanism for the creation
and the operation of such commit-
tees.
• The OPP has lane groups of a similar
size.
• The residents were adamant that the
high standards were unaffordable; an
interesting stand-off arose when, in
effect, the residents said that if the
officials insisted on using government
standards there would be no project
i.e. no lane sewer at all. A balance of
cost and quality was the prime
concern for the community; however,
they did see the importance of
marginally increasing the standards
for manhole covers.
• Rather surprisingly, the cost estimate
based on market rates was found to
be cheaper than the SoR. It seems to
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Narrative
reported for the approval purposes
were the rates based on the
government schedule.
8. The PMU established a Project
Approval Committee that has to
approve  all FAUP expenditure on
project activities. A docment entitled
‘activity proposal’ was put forward
for approval by the committee.
9. This proposal document gives the
background, cost estimates,
sketches of design, and the
mechanism for implementation. It
also states what the project is
aiming to achieve.
10. Included on the Project Approval
Committee were the Municipal
Engineer and officials from FDA.
They expressed concern about the
authority of the committee and what
exactly it was empowered to do.
11. A memorandum of understanding is
signed by the PMU, the lane
committee and the project imple-
mentation committee. Another
committee comprising  one PMU
social organiser and one person
nominated by the lane committee is
proposed.
12. The project activity proposal
indicates that the increase of cost is
to be borne by the community but
the contract indicates that the
increase will be proportionately
shared.
13. The actual contract duration was
about one month.
14. A joint account was opened to
operate the cash requirements; this
...Box 9. Continued
Commentary
be good practice to use more than
one basis for cost estimation; the
market rate gives a better idea of
what the work will actually cost.
• The activity proposal document could
be interpreted as consolidated file
notes, equivalent to the technical
sanction in the conventional govern-
ment process.
• The benefits in terms of employment,
income generation and enterprise
development were not explicitly
mentioned in the objectives of the
project.
• According to government procedure,
the authority for sanction and
approval is vested with individual
officers of a particular rank. Their
question about the legality of the
committee to grant approval is well
founded.
• The agreement is shown in Box 30.
• No estimate was made for the
duration of the project.
• This is not an official account of FDA;
people were initially reluctant to put
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Narrative
is a joint account of the PMU Social
Organiser and a member of the
community acting in their individual
capacities.
15. The cash flow and management of
the account is not recorded.
16. The labour arrangements were
varied; work was done both by lane
residents and (mainly) by sub-
contracted labour.
17. Typical lane sewers cost RS 12,000
to 18,000; approximately 25  per
cent of the cost is labour and 75 per
cent materials, which were pur-
chased from the local market.
18. There were deviations in the cost
even for such  small projects. The
ratio of contract cost and actual cost
was in the range of 1.06 to 0.94.
19. The project progress is reported to
the Senior Engineer and the
Finance and the Admin. Section as
well.
Commentary
their money into a joint  FDA account,
and confidence building was neces-
sary. The PMU staff acted as
intermediaries.
• Urban communities do not do all the
labour work themselves.
• This implies that from all the con-
tracts, about Rs 10,000 for labour and
Rs 29,000 for materials is circulating
in the local economy; this is a
significant benefit on top of those
claimed in the project proposal.
• There is inherent risk involved in
construction; the main reason here
reflects the problem of accurate cost
estimation.
• At the project level the process is
transparent.
...Box 9. Continued
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Box 10. Community as advisers
Over twenty years the Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority (CMDA) has
evolved a system which involves the communities with councillors and contractors in
a variety of ways in the slum improvement schemes funded by government and donors.
Narrative
1. Project formulation involves consultation
between the community, the CMDA and
the Municipality about what facilities are
to be provided within the budget. Clearly
understood  agreement is obtained
before work starts.
2. The contractor is required to have a
sample of his construction work (paving,
pipe laying, concreting, etc.) approved
by both the engineer and representa-
tives of the community together. This
sample of work  becomes the yardstick
against which the quality of the rest of
the work can be judged. All parties, that
is the community, the engineer and the
contractor therefore have a point of
reference against which future disagree-
ments can be discussed and resolved.
3. CMDA places great emphasis on
completion testing, for example of
pipelines. Certificated testing is
incorporated into the contract and it is
important that the contractor knows that
it will be carried out in every case.
Community  representatives are invited
to witness the testing so that they can
see that it has been done.
Commentary
• The consultation involves the
community, key local politicians
and the engineering department.
• The community does not have a
formal contractual role.
• CMDA places and enforces quite
strict requirements  on its
contractors. Whilst this will be
reflected in tender prices, they
are getting added value in the
form of improved overall manage-
ment of the jobs.
• The quality of work is excellent.
Insides - main text home 1.pmd 31/01/2003, 09:4157
58
Box 11. Community as partial engineer
Conventional contractor working for a NGO and supervised by a community; the Clean
Settlements Programme (CSPU) in Colombo, Sri Lanka
Narrative
1. External donor agency provided the funds to
the NGO.
2. Cost estimates were provided informally to
the NGO by the government authority.
3. The provision of funds took a long time and
the price of construction increased.
4. The donor refused to pay the escalated
cost.
5. The community paid the difference of about
20 per cent of the contract value.
6. NGO negotiated the contract with the
conventional contractors with the assistance
of the government authority. The community
was consulted at every stage.
7. The conditions of contract used were similar
to those of the NHDA community contract.
8. A copy of the contract document was
provided to the community.
9. Community participated in the supervision of
the work.
Review of the contract between the NGO
and the conventional contractor.
10. The parties to the contract are the NGO and
the contractor. Reference is made to the
CSPU to provide the plans.
11. The contractor to complete the works for a
certain amount.
12. The work to be started within a certain time
period.
13. If part of the work is found to be of inferior
quality the payments would be suspended
for the whole section.
Commentary
• Funding direct to the NGO.
• Informal relations existed as
the NGO official was an ex-
public sector official.
• The longer the procedures the
larger the risk of the price
escalation.
• Community as partial
financiers and client.
• NGO as partial Engineer
along with the public sector
CSPU.
• The process was transparent.
• Community as partial
Engineer.
• The CSPU as the partial
Engineer.
• Emphasis on quality.
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Narrative
14. The contractor to take the third party risk.
15. The type of contract is ‘measure and pay’.
16. 10 per cent security deposit is to be
released after the end of the six month
defect liability period.
17. Liquidated damages would be charged at
the rate of Rupees 100 per day.
18. No claim for the price escalation is permit-
ted.
19. Any extension of the contract in the case of
unavoidable circumstances is to be mutually
agreed.
20. Changes to the instructions are to be in
writing.
21. First bill to be submitted after 20 per cent of
the work is completed.
22. Sub-contracting is possible with the consent
of the client.
23. Un-satisfactory workers to be removed from
the site.
24. Reference is made to labour law for
payment to the labourers.
25. The contractor to provide employer
provident fund payments to labourers
26. The contractor to obtain the workmen’s
compensation policy.
...Box 11. Continued
Commentary
• The risk to be transferred
from the NGO.
• Standard government attitude
adopted by the NGO.
• Standard provision.
• The contractor may encounter
cash flow problems.
• Note the  strong influence of
government conditions of
contract. It seems that the
NGO also adopted the role of
a conventional client.
• One main difference here is
that although the procurement
process is apparently the
same, there is no requirement
for registration and enlist-
ment. This creates access for
micro-contractors who work
under the supervision of the
CBO.
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Box 12. Community and NGO monitor a large Government
contract
A loan from an international lending bank was taken by urban government, who hired
a well known national consultant to plan and design slum improvement work; the NGO
monitored the works in Karachi, Pakistan.
Narrative
1. At an early stage, the city Mayor instigated
negotiations with a well-known NGO already
active in the area, who was offered a
contract for monitoring the works. A contract
was signed by the government department,
the Consultant and the NGO.
2. The Contractor signed a contract for
construction with the government depart-
ment.
3. The contractor was not a resident of the
area; local people were not hired by the
contractor who brought his own team of
workers.
4. NGO provided technical assistance to the
people for lane level construction.
5. Details of the work were provided to the
NGO.
6. The NGO held a meeting at which commu-
nity based organisations (CBOs) and local
people agreed to assist; this ensured
adequate coverage, with people monitoring
work in their own area.
7. The NGO provided zonal managers, with
area managers from the CBOs under them.
Lane residents reported to the CBOs.
8. Some lane residents received daily wages
from the NGO.
9. The main contractor offered inducements to
government officials so that they did not
create problems on the job.
10. The work was sub-contracted out into 56
contracts, with many more sub-contracts.
Commentary
• The political dimension is
important. The Mayor of the
city was shrewd enough to
realise that, if the local people
were not involved then, the
contractor would receive no
co-operation from the
residents.
• Contractors have mixed
views on using local labour;
(Box 14)
• NGO to be technically
competent.
• NGO managed to get the
relevant information.
• The NGO was very effective
in developing a network to
achieve its objectives.
• Unfortunately, this is a
standard practice.
• This is normally prohibited
under the terms of the
contracts used, but commonly
occurs.
Insides - main text home 1.pmd 31/01/2003, 09:4160
61
Narrative
11. When the work started it was soon realised
that the people were watching and were
aware of the basic scope and the specifica-
tion of the work. Their input prevented the
contractor taking short cuts.
12. The NGO had good connections at senior
levels in government which they used if
there were problems with junior officials.
13. The finished work was of good quality.
14. The completion of the contract was slightly
delayed; some claims were made by the
contractor for the cost of delays caused by
stoppage of the work.
15. After the work was completed the CBO hired
local people to clean the drains and do
minor repairs on a regular basis.
16. During the process, people benefited from
informal training in the supervision of works.
Subsequently, residents from other area
contacted them for help.
Commentary
• The works involved are
clearly well within the
community’s comprehension.
• The political dimension was
important; a CBO does not
have this sort of entrée,
unless there is a particularly
active councillor.
• A sense of ownership is there.
• Increased networking at the
community level, resulting
from improved skills and
confidence.
...Box 12. Continued
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Box 13. Use of departmental works practice
The Community, NGO, and state government are  involved in external works in
Karachi, Pakistan. Most of our cases relate to communities contributing to internal
works, that is, to improvements to the infrastructure within the neighbourhood, lane
or cluster. This case concerns external works, that is, the infrastructure outside the
neighbourhood that is necessary to support the internal infrastructure. State
government pays the full cost of the external works.
Narrative
1. Initially, the conventional tender-contract
procedure was adopted.
2. The contractors were not performing to the
satisfaction of the NGO who was appointed
to  monitor the works.
3. The state government then opted to use the
departmental works procedure (Box 2).
4. Materials were purchased by the department
and labour contracts were agreed  through
negotiation.
5. Small contractors and some local artisans
were employed.
6. All the contracts were signed in the
presence of the NGO and a CBO repre-
sentative.
7. The contract is best described as a
memorandum of understanding; no standard
forms or conditions were used and docu-
ments were written in the local language.
8. The final bill was not released until the CBO
and NGO were satisfied with the work.
9. The resulting quality of work was superior.
10. The cost was lower than that of conventional
contracting, as the profit of the main
contractor was eliminated.
11. After construction of these external works,
local people have started installing internal
works.
12. The work is on-going.
Commentary
• The staff of the authority are
unhappy as they now have to
do work which was originally
done by the contractor: e.g.
purchase of material and
delivery to the site on time;
responsibility for security of
materials; responsibility for
quality of the work; manage-
ment of workforce.
• The overall responsibility for
performance and mainte-
nance of the works is being
disputed by the different
stakeholders.
• Using PWD-based enlistment
of contractors and tender
process.
• Despite the good quality of
the work and the low final
cost, officials are concerned
about possible audit objec-
tions as there was no
demonstrable competition.
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Box 14. Community supplies labour to a private sector contractor
The use of local labour in a donor-funded programme implemented by urban government:
Cochin, India.
Narrative
1. Under a contract won by competitive tender,
the contractor has made use of some local
unskilled labour for landfilling operations.
2. The contractor was specifically requested to
do this by the Municipality (the promotor).
3. Wages paid so far amounts to Rs 2,500 in
total; it is low because machine-based
methods are necessary for much of the
filling work.
4. Discussions are in hand about future work
on formation of access ways amounting to
Rs 33,500.
5. Many contractors have their own direct
labour force that they keep on the books
and pay even when there is no work
available.
6. For the recruitment of additional unskilled
labour, the contractors turn to one of the
many labour agents in the area. These
agents recruit on a daily basis from
gatherings at known meeting places. This is,
the accepted method of hiring casual labour.
7. The rates paid for unskilled labour, known
locally as ‘market rates’, appear to be
controlled by strong union activity and are
always higher than the Schedule of Rates
specifies.
8. Contractors are ambivalent about being
required to employ labour from the commu-
nity.
9. On the positive side, they believe it helps in
overcoming potential and actual hostilities
with the community.
10. The downside for the contractors is a
concern that they cannot exercise sufficient
control over the performance of the workers,
“who get the job by right” especially if local
organisations have strong political influence.
Commentary
• The contract was won in the
normal way through competi-
tive bidding.
• The contractor  is satisfied so
far with the community labour
supplied.
• There is a two-way loyalty;
the contractor maintains a
core work force, even during
lean times, which enables him
to respond rapidly using
workers whom he can trust to
deliver. Labourers who are
retained in this way are
reluctant to take part in
community-based works
which their contractor might
otherwise bid for.
• Good relations with the
community are essential for
completing work on time and
within budget. In extreme
cases the community may
deny the contractor access to
the site.
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Box 15. Community as a labour-only contractor for government
A donor-funded programme implemented by urban government: Cochin, India
Commentary
• The use of negotiation is a
key issue here; the communi-
ties agreed to rates below the
current ‘market rate’, that is
the rate at which unionised
labour is available.
• This clearly illustrates the
need for local support and
capacity building, it cannot be
neglected.
• This represents good value
for money for the promoter
which is very important for
those officials responsible for
adopting non-routine ways of
working.
Narrative
1. In two separate communities, labour
contracts between the Municipality and the
Community Management Group (CMG)
have been used for the formation of lanes
by placing gravel fill. Material was supplied
by the Municipality (the promoter).
2. Initial efforts did not produce satisfactory
quality work because of lack of technical
support and supervision.
3. The negotiated labour rates were lower than
the current market rates.
4. A total of Rs 12,300 has gone into the
communities in the form of waged labour.
5. Negotiations with the community are
underway for an additional Rs 78,600 of
work pertaining to cleaning and renovating
the drainage system and concreting some
lanes.
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Box 16. Community as contractors for urban government (Cochin)
A donor-funded programme implemented by urban government: Cochin, India
Narrative
1. A contract has been awarded by
the Municipality (the promoter) to
one CMG for the construction of a
new septic tank.
2. The contract was awarded
through negotiation with the
CMG, following a general call for
tenders, whose purpose was
‘market testing’.
3. The CMG has taken responsibility
for procurement of materials and
construction.
4. The value of the works is
Rs 50,000.
5. The major problem was in
obtaining credit for materials
purchase.
6. A mason and a carpenter teamed
up to provide skilled labour and
construction management inputs
for the contract.
7. Work is in progress. Depending
upon performance on this
contract, work for the remaining
septic tanks will be negotiated
with the community. The value of
the works will be Rs 385,000,
with a further Rs 71,20 available
for drainage related works.
8. Difficulties arose regarding
control of the work and internal
accountability which need further
study.
Commentary
• Negotiation plays an important role; the
final price was 10-20 per cent lower than
a typical contractor’s tender.
• The ‘market testing’ served the purpose
of demonstrating value for money;
however, contractors are unlikely to
tender if word gets round that it is the
intention to offer the contract to the
community.
• The CMG was unable to secure credit
for materials purchase; the problem was
resolved by an official advancing a
government loan taken out in his name.
A commendable gesture, but clearly a
risky and unsustainable approach.  This
problem arose because government
procedure operates on a cost reim-
bursement basis.
• In addition to income generation,
enterprise development is evident
through the teaming up of a mason and
a carpenter.
• There may also be negative impacts on
the dynamics of the CMG; these need
assessing.
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Box 17. Community as contractors for urban government (Cuttack)
The first time a contract was awarded by government to a community management
group (CMG) in Cuttack, India, was for the construction of a community latrine, an open
drain and some paving. The work was financed by a donor through a Project
Management Unit (PMU) in local urban government. We have abstracted a chronological
series of exhibits from the project file which reveals how matters developed.
Narrative
7/5/94
Letter signed jointly by the residents of Pattapol
to the Collector and District Magistrate request-
ing the municipality to do the improvement work.
26/5/94
Document entitled ‘resolution no. 16’, signed
jointly by residents formalising the CMG.
2/7/94
A letter from the secretary of the CMG; the two
other signatures are not clear, but a stamp pad
is used by the secretary. The letter is addressed
to the PMU, and ‘allows the persons sent by
you’(i.e. PMU officers) to do the job. It also
promises to provide labour.
Undated:
A letter to the PMU from the CMG expressing
interest in doing the work.
14/9/94
A letter from the CMG to the Director PMU,
requesting an extraordinary meeting to discuss
progress. The letter was typed in English on
CMG-headed paper with the names and
designations of 28 office bearers (six of whom
are female), a phone number, and a reference
number. Copies were sent to councillors,
Municipal Health Officer,  Project Officer,
Community Organiser, Executive Officer of
Cuttack Municipality and an Architect.
23/8/95
A handwritten letter in English from the CMG to
the Collector, Mayor and the Director of the
PMU regarding the problems of the area and
referring to the previous correspondence.
Alongside the Secretary's stamp is a larger
stamp with a registration number on it.
Commentary
• Demand from the residents to
start things moving is the first
stage in formulating the plans
for improvement.
• The CMG establishes itself
as the means of communica-
tion between residents and
the government.
• The CMG is becoming much
more formal.
• An indication that the work
was to be sub-let to the CMG
on a labour only basis.
• The CMG shows a surpris-
ingly good understanding of
bureaucratic needs and
channels, indicating the
support given by PMU
officials.
• Increasing formalities in the
CMG’s dealings.
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...Box 17. Continued
Narrative
18/9/95
A formal letter to the Project Director PMU with
proper references, signed by the president and
stamped; a copy was sent to the Engineering
Manager. The letter concerns a call for tenders
and indicates the interest of the CMG in the
execution of the work in their area. There is a
reference to the ‘unemployed youths of the area’
as a justification to give them the construction
work.
22/9/95
A letter from the CMG agreeing to execute the
work; reference is made to a verbal discussion.
A request is made to give details of the works,
the Schedule of Rates and the contract
agreement.
28/9/95
A letter from the CMG stating  that the forms
which were sent by the PMU were lacking some
details. The CMG was requested to fill in the
form in type on a non-judicial paper. Apparently,
the contract was also sent.
7/10/95
A letter from the CMG challenging the PMU on
its decision to re advertise the tender for the
work which they have already consented to
carry out. There are some criticisms on the
‘Skeleton form’ of the ‘community contract’. It
also states that the previously requested details
were not sent.
17/10/95
A letter from the Engineering Manager to attend
his office within 7 days for the ‘perusal of the
relevant’ and ‘signing the agreement’.
18/10/95 and 12/11/95
Letters showing the current impasse.
15/11/95
A letter from the CMG Secretary stating that
they are starting the work.
Commentary
• Tenders were invited from the
conventional contractor as
well. From the files it is not
clear as to whether they
actually received the bids or
not.
• This suggests that the matter
has to be passed by the
executive body. A verbal
agreement is reached in
principle without any
documentation; this does not
happen within conventional
procedures. A relational
contract is developing.
• The CMG was sent the forms
of contract to be signed
without giving them any
details. These they de-
manded. For them, dealing
with the Government seems
a serious business. Neverthe-
less, it seems that the
contract was already agreed;
the actual documents may be
formalities.
• An indication of empower-
ment; the CMG is no longer
just a passive receiver.
• Some discomfort on the part
of the  Engineering Manager,
who is being questioned by
the CMG.
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Narrative
7/12/95
A letter from the CMG requesting design
changes.
14/12/95
A letter from the CMG demanding confirmation
of the changes.
14/12/95
A separate letter claiming for the resulting
additional expenditure.
Undated
A note from the CMG on the number of the
beneficiaries of the community latrines in terms
of gender.
...Box 17. Continued
Commentary
• A verbal deal was struck to
resolve the impasse.
• The PMU created a precedent
by permitting cash advances
to be paid to the CMG
(compare Box 16)
• The CMG is involved in some
form of monitoring and
evaluation.
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Box 18. Communities as contractor and manager for 150
government contracts
During the late 1980’s the National Housing Development Authority (NHDA) of Sri
Lanka pioneered a system known as community contracting. The NHDA promoted the
development of  Community Development Councils (CDC), through which the program
operated. This remains one of the most important programs of its kind anywhere.
Narrative
1. The CDC identified community
requirements with the NHDA and
sometimes NGO support.
2. Over a three year period 150
contracts were awarded. 65
were awarded to 27 communities;
32 per cent of the contracts were
awarded to two particularly active
communities.
3. Most of the work involved
sanitation and water supply.
4. Some communities provided
labour themselves whilst others
hired it in through informal
subcontracts.
5. 93 contracts between 1986-89
amounted to RS 4.7 million, of
which  about RS 1.7 million was
for labour.
6. The quality of work was good;
the cost was about 20 per cent
less than conventional contract-
ing, with less than 10 per cent of
contracts overrunning their cost.
7. NHDA engineers and account-
ants had reservations about this
approach.
8. The CDC’s experienced
problems in obtaining advance
payment.
9. The Municipal Council is officially
responsible for maintenance.
10. It is not clear to what extent the
NHDA schemes are actually
having maintenance works
carried out or by whom.
Commentary
• CDCs have legal status, equivalent to
that of an ‘approved registered society’,
to undertake specific works.
• Making such choices are themselves
experiences in empowerment.
• Both waged labour money and the
money used for the local purchase of the
materials is injected into the local
economy. This has an important impact
on the local market for building materials.
• The time performance was not as good
as the cost and the quality. There was no
systematic method to determine the
contract duration.
• Questions were asked about the legality
of the contracts and the lack of formal
accountability in the process adopted. In
some cases the CDC managed to obtain
finance privately. The officials also co-
operated in advancing the money before
the work was completed. This was a risk,
as cost reimbursement is made on
certification of completion.
• The Municipal council has not adopted
the system of community contracting.
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Box 19. The community contracting process in the NHDA,
Sri Lanka
Boxes 19 to 26 focus on process and contracting issues involving the community in the
procurement process.
Narrative
Contracting process
1. Drawings approved by the Deputy
General Manager (DGM), Engineering
services, generally signed on the
Drawing.
2. Estimates approved by the Manger
Quantity surveying.
3. On query from Divisional secretary, a
list of potential community contractors is
provided.
4. Quotation and consent called from the
recommended community contractors.
5. Contractor is selected.
6. Approval for the contract award is taken
from the NHDA Chairman.
7. Letter of award.
8. Contract is signed.
9. It generally takes 3 months from
preparing the drawings to the signing of
the contract.
Billing process
10. Technical officer helps the contractors to
prepare the bill and measurement
sheets.
Commentary
• Equivalent to the technical
sanction in works procedure of
PWD.
• Same as above.
• CDCs are selected in consultation
with NHDA. The implication is that
a list of the potential community
contractors is available.
• If the contractor is from outside
the community, quotations are
called for.
• The most senior official in the
organisation approves the
contract award. This may be
because the lower level officials
are not confident about the
legality of the procedure they are
adopting.
• Very similar to the PWD proce-
dures. The main difference is in
the selection of bidder and the
contractor, non-conventional
contractors and negotiation.
• Lead time for signing the
community contract.
• Officials supervise preparation of
the Bill. This could reduce the
time taken in checking.
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Narrative
11. Measurement sheet signed by the
technical officer and the Contractor’s
representative.
12. Engineer checks, signs and sends to
the Quantity surveyor (QS).
13. QS checks and sends back to the
Engineer.
14. Engineer recommends it and sends it to
DGM Engineering.
15. DGM approves it and sends it to the
DGM Finance.
16. DGM Finance processes the bill which
is then paid
17. It takes about one month from the
Technical officer preparing the bill
before the payment is made.
Some comments by NHDA officials.
18. There is now not much difference in the
supervision time for the conventional
contractor and the community contrac-
tor.
19. Community contractors experience
cash flow problems; they wait for the
payment before proceeding to the next
stage
20. The work is in some cases sub-
contracted out. The labourers are, in
general, from the community but skilled
workers come from outside. Daily rates
for skilled and unskilled labour were Rs
250 and Rs 150-200 respectively.
21. Generally, materials are bought locally,
but in case of shortages it may be
issued from the government stores.
22. Officials think that CDC makes more
than 15% profit and invest in some
businesses.
...Box 19. Continued
Commentary
• Joint measurement for the
‘measure and pay’ approach.
• For payment the bill does not go
higher than the DGM (approxi-
mately five steps).
• Bill processing time.
• Initially it took much more time to
handle community contracts.
Now that there is an operational
system in place, there is no
significant difference in the
management of conventional
contracts and community
contracts.
• Bill processing time is an
important consideration for
payment to the small contractors
as they do not have much
working capital.
• Income generation.
• Circulation of money in the local
area.
• Enterprise development and
making a profit is important for
sustaining the activities.
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Narrative
1. A large scale enquiry by the Treasury was
held to ‘review the entire system of negoti-
ated contracts to societies’ Their main
concerns were:
• ‘the public funds are squandered by the
interested parties’;
• lack of transparency.
2. All government organisations who have
used the system were asked for:
• the upper limit value of the contracts;
• types of work suitable for this approach;
• defining the capability of the societies.
3. NHDA responses centred on:
• The system is effective in utilisation of
local and foreign funds.
• The community contract is a key tool for
community participation.
• The system was internationally ac-
claimed.
• Their systems have been audited and
‘have not revealed any adverse com-
ments’.
• The benefits are; speed, quality, user
satisfaction and the ‘benefits of profits
being passed to the user communities’.
The shorter delivery time was also
emphasised.
4. The action proposed to improve the situation
is to register the societies and to take their
capabilities into consideration.
Box 20. The Government of Sri Lanka reviews and assimilates
community management and contracting
This Box is based on a review of a series of letters between officials of the Ministry of
Housing, Construction and Public Utilities and the Ministry of Finance during 1995. It
is particularly interesting because it reviews and questions the whole concept of
community based procurement in an open and non-perjorative fashion.
Commentary
• These enquiries should be
seen in a positive light. The
government is not seeking to
abandon the practice but to
overcome its shortcomings.
Their concerns are perfectly
reasonable.
• There is a  will to assimilate
the on going process by
moulding it into a shape
which fits the public sector
processes.
• Key points in the defence are:
a means to meet wider
objectives which is not
afforded in conventional
contracting; the system has a
good reputation.
• Getting the initiatives audited
has  turned out to be an
advantage.
• A clear understanding of the
benefits of the system. It is
not only the construction time
but time including preparation
time for the contract.
• The capacity of the commu-
nity is an important considera-
tion. Mechanisms are required
to evaluate that capacity.
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...Box 20. Continued
Narrative
5. A committee of technical and administrative
staff was appointed to recommend to the
Divisional Secretary which societies should
be enlisted.
6. The list of registered societies is to be made
available to all  Government institutions.
Commentary
• Equivalent to the registration
of conventional  contractors.
• The enlistment only needs to
be done by one government
body; Societies can then
undertake work from more
than one department.
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Box 21. Government of Sri Lanka formally recognises community
management and contracting
Based on a review of the following Treasury circular letters
No. Finance 227 dated 1984.
No. Finance 255 dated 1988.
No. Finance 322 dated 1993.
No. Finance 345 dated 1996.
Narrative
1. The subject of the correspondence is the
award of small scale contracts to:
• rural development societies, Gramodaya
mandalayas and similar societies;
• multi purpose and labour Co-operative
Societies,
• approved societies;
• organisations in former irrigation
schemes.
2. The government had earlier approved some
organisations to undertake work; e.g.
School Development Boards (up to Rs 1
million) and youth clubs affiliated with Youth
Services Councils (up to Rs 37,500).
3. An exemption is granted to approved
societies, which can award small scale
construction work on a negotiated basis
without resorting to public tender proce-
dures. Number of contracts is restricted to
four per society with a total cost of Rs 1.0
Million.
4. The work is not awarded to the society for
works ‘outside the area of authority’. ‘Where
the area of authority is not defined the
Divisional Secretary of the area should be
regarded’.
5. The Committee on Public Accounts noted
that in order to enable approved societies to
take on as much as possible, major jobs
had been split into smaller parcels in order
not to exceed the upper financial limit. The
Ministry communicated its concern on this
matter.
Commentary
• The circulars are signed by
the  Deputy Secretary to the
Treasury.
• Provisions are made to enter
into contracts with legally
approved societies.
• This is a crucially important
waiver offered to approved
societies
• Confidence in the societies
has increased. Previously the
limit was Rs 750,000.
• Note that the society is not
restricted to the locality where
it exists. In some cases it
may be the whole division,
but they act within a defined
jurisdiction.
• This emphasises that the use
of public money is open to
scrutiny, and that there are
‘watchdogs’ whose duty it is
to draw attention to proce-
dural irregularity of any sort.
The underlying assumption is
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...Box 21. Continued
Narrative
6. The approved societies must ‘provide all
necessary superintendence during execu-
tion’.
7. There is a strong emphasis of reporting on
the physical and financial targets of the
works.
8. ‘Concession .... does not dispense with the
requirement of the executing agencies
having to enter into a formal contract’.
9. ‘Undertaking of negotiated contracts.....does
not  debar any approved societies from
tendering for other projects’.
Commentary
that ‘unpackaging’ of
contracts is not  appropriate;
conventional wisdom is that
there are economies in
procurement if the opposite
occurs, i.e. packaging of
many small contracts into one
larger one.
• There is a difference in how
the contractor is selected,
here by negotiation, and the
way the contract is formed; it
remains a formal contract.
• This effectively permits the
societies to become ‘conven-
tional contractors’. On the
other hand the conventional
contractors may also become
‘approved societies’ and get
the work without tendering.
There is no mention that the
provisions are only for poor
areas. Negotiated contracts
with the approved societies
are supported by the
circulars.
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Box 22. NHDA Guidelines for community management and
contracting
The NHDA issued the following Guidelines for assigning small contracts to community
organisations. They were written in Sinhala for NHDA District Managers for use in the
‘100 Homes Programme’, which is a new low profile initiative for delivery of shelter on
the basis of electoral area.
Commentary
• The basis of the procedures
is clearly mentioned.
• Equivalent to Administrative
Approval and Technical
Sanction (Box 1).
• Equivalent to planning
permission.
• There is a clear requirement
for the society to register in
order to acquire the legal
status necessary to enter into
a contract. This clarifies the
legal status of the Society.
• Emphasis is on written
acceptance with clear
reference to the nominated
office-bearers of the Society.
Narrative
1. Reference is made to Financial Circulars of
1987 and 1993. Further details can be
obtained from the Deputy General Manager
(DGM) Engineering Services.
2. Before assigning the contract, plans and
estimates must be approved by the DGM
and the Officer for Financial Grants.
3. Construction should be on  ‘land legally
undertaken by the Housing Authority’ and
should be ‘technically certified for suitability
for consumption [i.e. usage]’.
4. Priority is given to the registered society of
the colony. If no such organisation is
available then one can be selected from
outside the area by the regional tender
board.
5. The society should show written consent to
accept to contract according to the respec-
tive plans, conditions and estimated cost.
6. The document should be signed by the
President, Secretary and Treasurer of the
society, and then by NHDA District
Manager.
7. A sample letter for the award of a  contract
is shown.
8. The letter assigning the contract (i.e. the
work order) must have:
• Contract number.
• Name of contract.
• Value of contract.
• Required date of completion.
• District Manager’s signature on behalf of
NHDA.
Insides - main text home 1.pmd 31/01/2003, 09:4176
77
...Box 22. Continued
Narrative
9. The Society has to give its written consent
to undertake the contract.
10. The contract has to be signed before the
start of the work.
11. There is a provision for damages due to
delays equivalent to 1/1600 of the value of
the work daily.
12. 15 per cent is allowed in the estimates as
institutional expenses or profit for the
registered society.
13. The original of the signed contract is kept by
the NHDA District Manager.
14. On the contract original, a postage stamp
should be attached and signed. The value of
the stamp should be proportional to the
contract value; 1 rupee for every 100 of the
contract value. A 10 rupees stamp should
be used for the contractor’s copy.
15. Copies are provided to the Contractor, DGM
NHDA, Auditor General, District Accountant
and the District Engineer.
16. Each copy of the contract agreement should
have the following attached:
• appendix of the agreement;
• letter awarding the contract;
• letter of consent from the Society;
• estimates signed by officials of the
society.
17. Every contract assigned by the District
Officer must be listed in a general ledger.
Commentary
• It is not clear who is offering
and who is accepting. It
appears that  the work order
is accepted once  the Society
formally agrees internally.
• The profit element is
formalised.
• This serves the function of a
revenue stamp; there is no
distinction made between the
revenue and the postage
stamp.
• These are the ‘concerned
persons’.
• The requirements are very
formal in nature.
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Box 23. A more complex process involving the community, NGO
and a Governmental project unit
The contracting arrangements in the programme of the Clean Settlements Project Unit
(CSPU) in Sri Lanka involve three parties, and are revealed by following the process
for financing and billing for work.
Narrative
1. Applications to formulate a
scheme come from the Divi-
sional Secretary (state govern-
ment) to the CSPU.
2. Feasibility study is done by the
CSPU.
3. Site is selected.
4. The applicant is informed; a
copy is sent to Divisional
Secretary.
5. ‘Support organisations’ (SOs)
are identified; CSPU selected 6
out of a list of 300 for phase 1
pilot projects.
6. Agreement signed with the SO.
7. SO starts mobilisation and
makes an assessment of the
capacity of the community.
8. A community action planning
workshop is organised by SO
and CSPU to work out the
needs of the community.
9. SO prepares plans for relevant
activities to be included in the
project proposal.
10. CSPU makes initial cost
estimates.
11. CSPU, through SO initiates
advocacy, and collects the 20
per cent financial contribution
from the community.
Commentary
• The community has to go through the
Divisional Secretary.
• There is no mention of involvement of the
CBO up to this point. It is assumed that
the application has come as a result of
such involvement.
• SOs are not necessarily just the NGOs
but include a variety of organisations who
have relevant resources to offer.
• The contract is between the SO and the
CSPU.
• Signing contract with the SO and site
selection are concurrent.
• Emphasis on use of the workshops.
• This is one of the first documents in the
payment files of the assignments. It is
similar to the ‘project activities proposal’
in FAUP (Box 9). The difference here is
that, apparently,  the SO does the
workshops rather than government.
Experience gained in the NHDA pro-
gramme was used.
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Narrative
12. The other project components
(health, education, social
development) start.
13. Detailed designs and cost
estimates are prepared.
14. The CBO lodges its contribution
in their bank account.
15. On receipt of money the
assignment (Contract) is signed
by the three parties.
16. Award letter issued to the CBO.
17. If required, a mobilisation
advance of 20 per cent of the
estimated cost can be made.
The SO may arrange the bank
guarantee, which is necessary
in most cases.
18. Work starts.
19. Technical officers of the SO
assist in obtaining materials, in
preparation of bills and day to
day management.
20. CSPU staff provide top level
supervision and problem
resolution. They also lay out the
work and provide the levels.
21. CBO have not so far subcon-
tracted any work, but it is
...Box 23. Continued
Commentary
• Equivalent to the technical sanction.
• CBOs have to have the bank account.
They link into the formal sector. There is
experience in such practices from previous
NHDA programmes.
• The documents are prepared but signed
only when the money is received.
• Similar to public works procedures.
• Is this what is supposed to happen? Is the
SO capable and willing to arrange the
bank guarantee? The requirement for a
bank guarantee indicates that for the
CBO an important barrier remains. It
subsequently appears that the SO
provided a note of reference rather than a
bank guarantee. The advance given by
the community was viewed as a cash
guarantee.
• This role is parallel to that played by the
officials and OPP in the case of SKAA
direct labour (Box 13, 25) and in NHDA
(Box 19). The officials also played a
similar role in community contracting in
NHDA. The role of the NGO is that of
partial Engineer and partial Contractor.
• The SO could not perform all of the
technical functions. Note the laying out of
work and levels are done by the CSPU.
Another tier of supervision; at what cost
and benefit?
• No restriction on sub-contracting
empowers the CBO.
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Commentary
• Role of NGO is that of engineer certifying
the bills.
• Checking the SO’s checking. Is this
excessive? If the SO is not trustworthy or
capable why give it the role?
• Very similar to conventional contracts. The
bills are paid in arrears; in addition the
deposit is also retained.
• Completion certificates are not yet issued
but will be in the future.
• This implies that the work is not handed
over to other government agencies. The
CBO appears  responsible for mainte-
nance. Are they capable of it?
• CBO’s retention money is kept until the
maintenance period is finished. This shows
that the CBO has the capacity to survive
the conventional barriers of procurement,
demonstrating enterprise development. The
next stage is to bid against conventional
contractors.
• A formal contract for maintenance was not
made due to the ‘temporary nature of the
CSPU’ who will not enter into a long term
agreement. This implies that any mainte-
nance contract has to be between perma-
nent organisations. The project’s organisa-
tions are not suitable to handle such tasks.
This also points out the importance of
having exit or completion procedures in the
project design. There needs to be clear
understanding as to which organisation is
going to inherit the liabilities of the project.
The organisation responsible for mainte-
nance must exist for the whole life cycle of
infrastructure or delegate such functions to
other organisations.
...Box 23. Continued
Narrative
permitted. They provide labour
from within communities or
hire usually skilled labour from
outside.
22. CBO submits the bill which is
checked and signed by the
SO.
23. CSPU Engineering staff verify
the measurement sheets and
‘measure and pay’.
24. A percent retention is kept but
the amount is not to exceed 5
per cent of the contract
amount.
25. Completion is not certified.
They are planning to issue
certificates for future works.
26. Hand over to the CBO.
27. Maintenance period, generally
for six months, commences.
Any defects identified in this
period are to be rectified.
28. End of defect liability period
and release of retention
money.
29. Maintenance should be done
by the CBO but there is no
agreement in place, nor is a
schedule of maintenance
provided.
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Narrative
1. A service agreement is signed by
the CSPU and a NGO.
2. The three phases of the project are:
development, implementation,
consolidation. For each phase a
different contract was signed. The
initial period was six months,
subsequently increased to one year.
3. The functions of the CSPU and
NGO are mentioned in the agree-
ment. The two components for
payment are: firstly staffing;
secondly based on project outcome.
4. Two month advance payment was
provided without any guarantee.
5. The NGO submits reports monthly
and is paid. A 10 per cent overhead
charges was agreed.
Review of project files
6. There are two types of files: contract
files and payment files. The contract
file deals with the stages up to the
signing of the contact.
7. The contract was in Sinhala.
8. The contract value for the implemen-
tation phase was Rs.158,070.
Box 24. Is the client getting value for money?
The cost of intermediaries
The Community acts as partial promoter/client and partial contractor with the
involvement of a NGO intermediary for the CSPU in Sri Lanka. (Also see Box 23)
Commentary
• Consultancy agreement with non-
professional organisations.
• Contracts are based on the phase of
the project and separate contracts are
signed for the stages with the same
NGO and for the same area.
• Parallel with the consulting services.
NGO as consultant.
• Advance without the guarantee is
possible to the NGO or in a service
contract with the NGO.
• This includes the profit as well.
• Similar filing system as in the
conventional government contracts.
• Use of local language, even when
dealing with the NGO.
• The consultancy cost is 1.79 times
that of the infrastructure contract cost.
Is this good value for money; what
are the additional benefits given that
CSPU officials are also playing role in
the projects? The activities related to
community development have been
paid separately to the NGO. It may be
that the NGO provides added  value
above that generally provided by
conventional consultants. This is a
learning phase for the projects in
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Narrative
9. A bill dated 21-05-96 shows the
breakdown. Under staff costs are:
salaries, travelling and NGO
management. Output costs include:
office rent, site office maintenance,
monitoring and documentation, and
NGO management at a rate of 10
per cent.
10. The contract for the project
development phase was
Rs.183,070 over for six months.
There is no contract for the
consolidation as yet.
...Box 24. Continued
Commentary
which management costs are high
when new processes are being
explored. Nevertheless, the NGO
cost associated with the implementa-
tion of contract is an important
consideration.
• Quite a high rate for management
from non-professional managers.
• The value of the contract was 2.03
times that of the contract amount for
infrastructure.
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Box 25. A modified process of Departmental Works using
NGO as consultants
Community acts as an agent of the NGO in supervising the works, and in some
cases as a contractor for SKAA works in Karachi, Pakistan.
Narrative
1. Departmental work is used for the
procurement.
2. The estimation is made on the basis
of market rates  jointly developed by
SKAA and OPP.
3. The language is made as simple as
possible.
4. The micro contractors are consulted
by SKAA for the estimation of rates.
5. The work is identified in consultation
with the community and the NGO.
The scope is restricted to external
works.
6. Either the Department or OPP
makes a plan which is exchanged
with the other party.
7. Estimates are prepared in consulta-
tion with the NGO. The NGO checks
the design and estimates.
8. A note sheet is prepared by the
Executive Engineer stating that the
identification was done, estimates
were prepared, and the NGO was
consulted and asked for approval. A
cash advance was requested. The
note was sent to the Director
General (DG).
9. The DG approves.
10. The file goes to the Director of
Finance.
11. The Director of Finance then
authorises the cash advance,
without which the departmental
works cannot proceed.
Commentary
• An alternative to competitive bidding.
• This is a deviation as the rates used
are not the government approved
schedule rates.
• The line items in the bill of quantities
have been simplified.
• The rates were developed in consulta-
tion with contractors.
• Plans are made with the community.
• Close working of NGO and depart-
ment.
• Estimates are approved by the NGO,
whose role is that of a consultant. The
public sector empowers the NGO.
• ‘Note sheet’ is the tool of communica-
tion between the officials.
• The DG’s approval is an important
safeguard.
• The Finance Department provides
money as an advance to the
Executive Engineer. This is critical in
departmental works. Payment is
made before the work is done, unlike
the contracting system where the
work is done before payment is
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Narrative
12. SKAA officials and the NGO enquire
whether the community can do the
work. If not, local micro contractors
are used; Officials negotiate the
price.
13. In the agreement the mode of
payment to the contractor is
specified, usually involving staged
payments .
14. The material is supplied to site by
the department.
15. Payment for materials is made
through a bank draft.
16. Once the material reaches the site,
the contractor starts the work.
17. After the work is completed and
tested the final payment is made to
the contractor.
...Box 25. Continued
Commentary
made. The advance is internal, and
the Engineer is responsible for all the
further disbursements.
• Community is given the choice. A
potentially complex role as  commu-
nity contractor, or as partial contractor
and partial consultant or as manage-
ment contractor.
• Personal verbal communication is
important. Negotiation is the key.
• Payment is an important issue to be
specified in the contract.
• Procuring material is a departmental
responsibility which may cause
problems in co-ordination, and involve
hidden costs in terms of time and
money for those involved. This in
effect is labour-only contract.
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Narrative
1. The contract is in Sinhala, the local
language.
2. Parties to the contract are men-
tioned along with their addresses.
3. The President/Chairman, Secretary
and the Treasurer are signatories
on behalf of the community
development council. The General
Manager is signatory on behalf of
NHDA.
4. There are spaces for two witnesses
to sign.
5. A summary sheet provides the
following details.
• compensation for delays.
• Work to be started within 14 days
of the contract.
• Defect liability period.
• 10 per cent security deposit to be
deducted from the running bill but
limited to 5 per cent of the
contract sum. 50 per cent of the
security is to be released on
completion of work and the
remainder at the end of the defect
liability period.
• Period for completion of contract.
• Type of contract is ‘measure and
pay’.
• The time limit for certificate of
payment is 28 days.
6. There are in total 12 clauses.
7. The scope of works and obligation of
the contractors is mentioned in the
first paragraph.
Boxes 26 to 30 look at the different forms of agreement and contract which have been
used in cases of community partnered procurement.
Box 26. Conditions of contract for community construction
contracts with NHDA Sri Lanka
Commentary
• A very obvious point often overlooked
by professionals.
• Standard drafting practice.
• Three office bearers sign on behalf of
the contractor.
• Standard practice.
• A useful way to provide an abstract,
with relevant details on one page.
• Security deposit remains part of the
process.
• Contract period is specifically
mentioned.
• To expedite payments and pro-
gramme the cash flow.
• Very concise
• Standard drafting practice
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Narrative
8. Clause 1. Obligations of NHDA
includes: funding, provision of plans,
provision of technical advice and
assistance to the construction
committee for implementation.
9. Clause 2. Refers to the agreed
estimates and states the commit-
ment from the contractor to
complete the proposed work
accordingly. Payments are to be
made on the basis of a bill. The
method of payment is ‘measure and
pay’.
10. Clause 3. Records to be kept by the
committee and made accessible to
the client.
11. Clause 4. Plans and instructions
given as the basis of implementa-
tion.
12. Clause 5. Material purchase,
storage and record keeping are the
responsibility of the construction
committee.
13. Clause 6. The committee must
employ trained and suitable workers
and keep records of the workers
and their wages.
14. Clause 7. Duration of the contract.
15. Clause 8. The committee must
follow the instruction of the client.
16. Clause 9. The president/chairman,
treasurer and two other members of
the construction committees are
liable for: loss of funds or materials,
stoppage of work, delays and
similar events. If the project is not
completed the supply of funds and
other services to that area will be
stopped.
...Box 26. Continued
Commentary
• Clear definition of the client’s tasks.
• Contract is based on the negotiated
rates. Disbursement is similar to
conventional contracts.
• Keeping  good records is important to
maintain transparency and account-
ability and good management.
• Instruction and personal communica-
tion is important and cannot be
replaced only by documents.
• Clear definition of the tasks of the
contractor.
• Emphasis on quality and accountabil-
ity.
• Importance of instructions is empha-
sised.
• Point of liability is defined. This is
somewhere between personal and
the organisational liability. In conjunc-
tion with clause 12, it seems the
liabilities are on organisations and not
on individuals.
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...Box 26. Continued
Narrative
17. Clause 10. The third party insurance
and workmen compensation
insurance to be provided. The cost
of insurance is to be reimbursed to
the contractor.
18. Clause 11. Breach of contract would
result in termination of the contract.
19. Clause 12. Clarification that the
agreement is ex-officio.
Commentary
• Insurance is required and paid by the
client. One option is for the insurance
to be arranged directly by the client.
• The contract is ‘self -enforcing’.
• The legal implications are that the
contract is between the organisations
represented by the signatories. The
contract will not be affected if an
official is replaced by another official.
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Box 27. The community construction contract in Cuttack, India.
Narrative
1. The signatories are the secretary of
the CMG and the Engineering
manager of PMU.
2. The title of the work was given and
reference was made to the draw-
ings, specifications and the
conditions of contract.
3. Stamped paper is used; there is a
stamp of ‘stamp vendor, D.S.R
office, Cuttack’ on the back of the
agreement form.
4. The CMG supplies the materials,
executes the work and maintains
the work for a required period.
5. The payment is based on the item
rates calculated from the Schedule
of Rates.
6. A witness also signs the documents.
7. A Purchase committee is constituted
by the PMU to buy materials; the
President and the secretary of the
CMG are to be the members.
8. The quantity of work done is to be
measured.
9. Security money of up to 10 per cent
of the value of the work may be
deducted at the discretion of the
officer-in-charge of PMU.
10. The maintenance or the defect
liability period is three months; the
defects are to be rectified by the
CMG or the security money will be
forfeited.
11. Employment of persons less than 12
years of age and giving wages less
than the government minimum
is prohibited.
Commentary
• A formal note is struck, following the
lines of a typical engineering
department contract .
• This involves making cash advances
to the CMG; this creates a special
case for CMGs as contractors.
• It is important to strive for internal
transparency.
• Measure and pay
• Maintenance beyond the defect
liability period is not addressed
• Standard clause reflecting national
laws
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...Box 27. Continued
Narrative
12. The officer in-charge of PMU can
enquire and decide in case of
complaints related to the payment of
wages, quality of work and other
matters.
13. The CMG must furnish proper
accounts.
14. A Schedule of Rates and some
sketches are attached.
Commentary
• His decision is binding and there is no
reference to arbitration.
• It is not clear whether these are to be
certified by the PMU or a third party.
They are important for transparency
and accountability both internally and
externally.
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Box 28. The contract used in the Departmental Works of SKAA
An example of a simple contract used for work in Zia-ul-Haq Colony in Karachi,
Pakistan.
Narrative
1. The contractor is named, along with
his national identity number and the
name of his father.
2. Plain paper rather than stamp paper
is used.
3. The contract is hand-written and in
the local language.
4. The scope of work is mentioned;
excavation, laying of pipes, jointing
and testing.
5. The rates are ‘per running foot’.
6. There are separate rates for valves
and bends.
7. The payments are staged and
related to the percentage of the
work completed. A fixed payment of
Rs. 7,000, is mentioned on
completion of 25 per cent of the
work.
8. Testing is mentioned as a separate
item
Commentary
• A certain formality is introduced.
• The contract is akin to a simple
memorandum of understanding.
• No separate conditions or specifica-
tions are provided or referred to.
• Use of item rates.
• Payment is related to the physical
progress.
• Indicates the importance attached to
testing
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Box 29. A contract between three parties with a NGO as the
partial consultant and partial contractor
The CSPU in Sri Lanka uses a more complex three party contract involving the CSPU,
the community and a NGO.
Narrative
1. The contract is in English.
2. The term used is ‘agreement for
community assignment’.
3. Parties to the contract are men-
tioned along with their addresses.
4. There are three parties in the
contract The CSPU is the first party,
CBO is the second and NGO is the
third.
5. A list of activities of the third party is
included as an Annex. These
include identification of the staff of
the second party, supervision,
assisting the community, acting as
guarantor, keeping in contact with
CSPU to solve problems, prepara-
tion of proposals, entering into the
agreement, providing technical
advice on behalf of the first party
and ‘other duties and functions’.
6. The President/Chairman, and the
Treasurer are signatories on behalf
of the Community Development
Council. The Director is signatory on
behalf of CSPU.
7. There are spaces for two witnesses
to sign.
8. There are, in total, 19 clauses.
9. The name and addresses of the
parties are mentioned. Reference is
made to the project, community
proposal and ‘assistance’ of the
third party.
Commentary
• The contract may have been
translated later.
• An attempt to make it apparently
different from a conventional contract
and the NHDA community contract.
• Standard drafting practice.
• Each signatory represents their
organisations. It is not a personal
contract.
• The third party acts as an agent of the
first party to control the second party.
These activities are very difficult to
cost. The relationship between the
first and the third party is governed by
another contract. What advantage is
gained by writing an agreement with
three parties?
• Two representatives sign on behalf of
the contractor.
• Standard practice.
• More complex than the NHDA
community contract.
• Standard practice.
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...Box 29. Continued
Narrative
10. Clause 1. Obligations of the first and
second party: the duration, the
remuneration for work and comple-
tion of the assignment by the
second party. The relationship is
between the first and the second
party only.
11. Clause 2. Refers to billing: the third
party will help the second party.
Reference is again made to the
community proposal, but it is
clarified that the payment would be
based on measurement.
12. Clause 3. Billing is to be done by the
second party and the first party is to
pay ‘within fortnight’.
13. Clause 4. Standard clause for the
retention and release of security
deposit. 10 per cent is deducted
from the running bill but this must
not exceed 5 per cent of the total.
50 per cent is released upon
completion of construction.
14. Clause 5. Refers to a separate
contract for payment for services to
the third party by the first party.
There is no direct mention of such
payments in this contract.
15. Clause 6. Provides a mechanism for
price escalation which exceeds 5
per cent. The reference date is the
date of contract signature and the
evidence is the receipts for
materials purchase. It is implied that
the labour cost escalation is not
covered.
Commentary
• Scope of the contract between the
first and the second party.
• Inputs from the first party through the
third party. The contract is ‘measure
and pay’.
• There is no mention of compensating
the second party at a fixed rate for
delays in payments.
• An important barrier affecting the
cash flow of the small contractors.
• Appears to be against the spirit of the
three party contract. Similar to
conventional contracting with the
NGO as Engineer.
• This is adventurous; no other small
scale contracts have allowed this. It
may be the influence of ICTAD. The
evidence required is not the same as
for large contracts. The question of
audit acceptability arises; would any
retail receipt be valid or only those of
government stores? So far no claims
have arisen in this regard.
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Commentary
• Options included the NGO arranging
a bond on behalf of the CBO. One
NGO reported that this was beyond
their capacity. There has to be a
realistic alignment of capacity.
• Gradual recovery helps cash flow
management. It is akin to an interest
free loan to the contractor.
• There is no description as to the kind
of maintenance or rectification
required.
• The clock starts from the letter of
acceptance. This presents a  barrier if
it is imposed. It seems unlikely to be
invoked.
• Similar to NHDA project organisation
with an addition of the NGO.
...Box 29. Continued
Narrative
16. Clause 7. The 20 per cent advance
payment could be made against a
security bond from commercial
bank, insurance agency or similar
security bonds provided through the
third party on behalf of the second
party.
17. Clause 8. Recovery of the advance
is made in instalments, starting
when 30 per cent (by cost) of the
work is complete. Full recovery
before 90 per cent of the work is
complete.
18. Clause 9 and 10. The maintenance
period, and the obligations of the
first party. No involvement of the
third party. 2.5 per cent of the
retained security will be released at
the end of the period. If the second
party defaults in not fulfilling the
requirements, the first party may get
the faults rectified at the expense of
the second party. The criterion to be
fulfilled is the ‘satisfaction of the first
party’.
19. Clause 11 and 12. Work to be
completed in the time prescribed. If
the second party cannot get an
extension to the contract the first
party can impose the liquidated
damages on the second party at the
prescribed rate. The limit of the
damages is 5 per cent of the total
value.
20. Clause 13. The project organisation.
The construction sub-committee
has members from CSPU, CBO and
NGO. Technical advice is provided
by the first party. There is an option
to provide such advice through the
third party.
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...Box 29. Continued
Narrative
21. Clause 14. Appropriate insurance
cover  to be provided by the second
party. The cost of insurance is to be
reimbursed by the first party. The
first and the third party are to be
fully indemnified.
22. Clause 15. The second party must
maintain transparency; this clause
holds them responsible for consult-
ing the community.
23. Clause 16. The second party is
responsible to ‘duly maintain daily
accounts, inventories, stock books,
attendance registers and reports’
which are accessible to the first
party.
24. Clause 17. Termination of the
contract with the ‘consent of  all the
three parties’ or in case of breach
by the second party, the first party
could terminate the contract and
pay for the work completed ‘only’.
25. Clause 18. In case of disagreement
in the interpretation of the contract,
the Secretary of the Ministry is the
final authority.
26. Clause 19. ICTAD conditions are to
be inferred where ‘this agreement is
silent’
Commentary
• The cost is ultimately borne by the
client. The risk is transferred to the
insurance by the first party. Not much
detail is provided regarding the kind of
insurance.
• This implies a difference between ‘the
community’ and the CBO. The form of
consultation (e.g. number of meetings
or their outcome) is not specified. It is
difficult to establish whether the
contractor met this requirement or
not.
• No provision for independent
arbitration or conciliation.
• ICTAD conditions refer to two party
contracts. It is confusing to define the
NGO as a party and then to refer to
the framework of a two party contract.
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Box 30. The contract used in the FAUP, Faisalabad, Pakistan
This contract was used for lane sewer projects.
Narrative
1. This particular agreement is typical
of several used.
2. The date of contract is 29-11-94; it
is written on plain paper.
3. The implementation committee is
responsible for supervision of the
work. The responsibility of ‘running
the project’ rests with the PMU
social organiser and one other
member of the committee.
4. The signatures were made without
mentioning designations.
5. The national identification of the
signatories was mentioned.
6. The stamp of FAUP is on both
pages.
7. Out of six names mentioned as the
neighbourhood committee only three
signatures were there. There was
no signature against the names of
the ‘supervisory committee’.
8. The signatures are generally not
dated.
Commentary
• This contrasts with the ‘stamp papers’
used in India and Sri-Lanka. It is
rather like a mutual understanding
between different individuals Whilst
neither standard wordings not
structure are used, there is a close
similarity between different agree-
ments .
• The atmosphere seems informal; the
clear message  is that it is not
intended to be used in the court of
law.
• It is not clear who are the parties to
the contract; neither are the proce-
dural steps of ‘offer’ and ‘acceptance’
clear.
• There is overlapping responsibility
with the PMU sub-engineer, who in
the eyes of the government would
appear to retain responsibility.
• The project duration is not mentioned.
• There is no clarity in the ‘agreement’
on what is to be done and for how
much. It does describe what the
different groups of people are
supposed to do.
It is not clear whether the agreement
is supposed  to serve any managerial
purpose.
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